On Wed, Dec 07, 2011 at 12:34:01PM +0200, Dor Laor wrote: > On 12/07/2011 06:03 AM, Michael Roth wrote: > >This adds a command-line option, -b/--blacklist, that accepts a > >comma-seperated list of RPCs to disable, or prints a list of > >available RPCs if passed "?". > > > >In consequence this also adds general blacklisting and RPC listing > >facilities to the new QMP dispatch/registry facilities, should the > >QMP monitor ever have a need for such a thing. > > Beyond run time disablement, how easy it is to compile out some of > the general commands such as exec/file-handling? > > Security certifications like common criteria usually ask to compile > out anything that might tamper security.
I don't think that's really relevant/needed. As discussed on the call yesterday, this is security theatre, because nothing can prevent the host admin from accessing guest RAM or disk data. AFAIK the virtualization related security certifications acknowledge this already & don't make any claims about security of guests against a malicious host admin. In any case, a suitable SELinux policy for the guest agent could prevent arbitrary file/binary access via generic 'exec' / 'file-read' commands, in a manner that is sufficient to satisfy security certications. Regards, Daniel -- |: http://berrange.com -o- http://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange/ :| |: http://libvirt.org -o- http://virt-manager.org :| |: http://autobuild.org -o- http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/ :| |: http://entangle-photo.org -o- http://live.gnome.org/gtk-vnc :|
