On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 03:48:52PM +0300, Dov Murik wrote:
>
>
> On 15/06/2021 22:53, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé wrote:
> > Hi Dov, James,
> >
> > +Connor who asked to be reviewer.
> >
> > On 6/15/21 5:20 PM, Eduardo Habkost wrote:
> >> On Tue, May 25, 2021 at 06:59:31AM +0000, Dov Murik wrote:
> >>> From: James Bottomley <j...@linux.ibm.com>
> >>>
> >>> If the VM is using memory encryption and also specifies a kernel/initrd
> >>> or appended command line, calculate the hashes and add them to the
> >>> encrypted data. For this to work, OVMF must support an encrypted area
> >>> to place the data which is advertised via a special GUID in the OVMF
> >>> reset table (if the GUID doesn't exist, the user isn't allowed to pass
> >>> in the kernel/initrd/cmdline via the fw_cfg interface).
> >>>
> >>> The hashes of each of the files is calculated (or the string in the case
> >>> of the cmdline with trailing '\0' included). Each entry in the hashes
> >>> table is GUID identified and since they're passed through the memcrypt
> >>> interface, the hash of the encrypted data will be accumulated by the
> >>> PSP.
> >>>
> >>> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <j...@linux.ibm.com>
> >>> Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmu...@linux.ibm.com>
> >>> [dovmu...@linux.ibm.com: use machine->cgs, remove parsing of GUID
> >>> strings, remove GCC pragma, fix checkpatch errors]
> >>> ---
> >>>
> >>> OVMF support for handling the table of hashes (verifying that the
> >>> kernel/initrd/cmdline passed via the fw_cfg interface indeed correspond
> >>> to the measured hashes in the table) will be posted soon to edk2-devel.
> >>>
> >>> ---
> >>> hw/i386/x86.c | 120 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> >>> 1 file changed, 119 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >>>
> >>
> >> This is not an objection to the patch itself, but: can we do
> >> something to move all sev-related code to sev.c? It would make
> >> the process of assigning a maintainer and reviewing/merging
> >> future patches much simpler.
> >>
> >> I am not familiar with SEV internals, so my only question is
> >> about configurations where SEV is disabled:
> >>
> >> [...]
> >>> diff --git a/hw/i386/x86.c b/hw/i386/x86.c
> >>> @@ -778,6 +818,11 @@ void x86_load_linux(X86MachineState *x86ms,
> >>> const char *initrd_filename = machine->initrd_filename;
> >>> const char *dtb_filename = machine->dtb;
> >>> const char *kernel_cmdline = machine->kernel_cmdline;
> >>> + uint8_t buf[HASH_SIZE];
> >>> + uint8_t *hash = buf;
> >>> + size_t hash_len = sizeof(buf);
> >>> + struct sev_hash_table *sev_ht = NULL;
> >>> + int sev_ht_index = 0;
> >
> > Can you move all these variable into a structure, and use it as a
> > SEV loader context?
> >
> > Then each block of code you added can be moved to its own function,
> > self-described, working with the previous context.
> >
> > The functions can be declared in sev_i386.h and defined in sev.c as
> > Eduardo suggested.
> >
>
> Thanks Philippe, I'll try this approach.
>
>
> I assume you mean that an addition like this:
>
> + if (sev_ht) {
> + struct sev_hash_table_entry *e = &sev_ht->entries[sev_ht_index++];
> +
> + qcrypto_hash_bytes(QCRYPTO_HASH_ALG_SHA256, (char *)kernel_cmdline,
> + strlen(kernel_cmdline) + 1,
> + &hash, &hash_len, &error_fatal);
> + memcpy(e->hash, hash, hash_len);
> + e->len = sizeof(*e);
> + memcpy(e->guid, sev_cmdline_entry_guid, sizeof(e->guid));
> + }
>
> will be extracted to a function, and here (in x86_load_linux()) replaced
> with a single call:
>
> sev_kernel_loader_calc_cmdline_hash(&sev_loader_context, kernel_cmdline);
>
> and that function will have an empty stub in non-SEV builds, and a do-
> nothing condition (at the beginning) if it's an SEV-disabled VM, and
> will do the actual work in SEV VMs.
>
> Right?
I would suggest a generic notification mechanism instead, where
SEV code could register to be notified after the kernel/initrd is
loaded.
Maybe the existing qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier()
mechanism would be enough for this? Is there a reason the hash
calculation needs to be done inside x86_load_linux(),
specifically?
>
>
> Also, should I base my next version on top of the current master, or on
> top of your SEV-Housekeeping patch series, or on top of some other tree?
>
>
> -Dov
>
> >>>
> >>> /* Align to 16 bytes as a paranoia measure */
> >>> cmdline_size = (strlen(kernel_cmdline) + 16) & ~15;
> >>> @@ -799,6 +844,22 @@ void x86_load_linux(X86MachineState *x86ms,
> >>> exit(1);
> >>> }
> >>>
> >>> + if (machine->cgs && machine->cgs->ready) {
> >>
> >> machine->cgs doesn't seem to be a SEV-specific field.
> >> What if machine->cgs->ready is set but SEV is disabled?
> >>
> >>> + uint8_t *data;
> >>> + struct sev_hash_table_descriptor *area;
> >>> +
> >>> + if (!pc_system_ovmf_table_find(SEV_HASH_TABLE_RV_GUID, &data,
> >>> NULL)) {
> >>> + fprintf(stderr, "qemu: kernel command line specified but
> >>> OVMF has "
> >>> + "no hash table guid\n");
> >>> + exit(1);
> >>> + }
> >>> + area = (struct sev_hash_table_descriptor *)data;
> >>> +
> >>> + sev_ht = qemu_map_ram_ptr(NULL, area->base);
> >>> + memcpy(sev_ht->guid, sev_hash_table_header_guid,
> >>> sizeof(sev_ht->guid));
> >>> + sev_ht->len = sizeof(*sev_ht);
> >>> + }
> >>> +
> >>> /* kernel protocol version */
> >>> if (ldl_p(header + 0x202) == 0x53726448) {
> >>> protocol = lduw_p(header + 0x206);
> >> [...]
> >>
> >
>
--
Eduardo
