On Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:34:52 +0100
Miklos Szeredi <mszer...@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 27, 2021 at 11:20 AM Greg Kurz <gr...@kaod.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, 27 Jan 2021 10:25:28 +0100
> > Miklos Szeredi <mszer...@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > > On Tue, Jan 26, 2021 at 6:18 PM Greg Kurz <gr...@kaod.org> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Tue, 26 Jan 2021 10:35:02 +0000
> > > > Stefan Hajnoczi <stefa...@redhat.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > > The patch looks pretty good to me. It just seems to be missing a change
> > > > in
> > > > lo_create():
> > > >
> > > > fd = openat(parent_inode->fd, name, (fi->flags | O_CREAT) &
> > > > ~O_NOFOLLOW,
> > > > mode);
> > > >
> > > > A malicious guest could have created anything called ${name} in this
> > > > directory
> > > > before calling FUSE_CREATE and we'll open it blindly, or I'm missing
> > > > something ?
> > >
> > > Right, this seems like an omission.
> > >
> > > Also the "& ~O_NOFOLLOW" looks like a copy-paste bug, since unlike
> > > lo_open(), lo_create() is not opening a proc symlink.
> > >
> > > So that should be replaced with "| O_NOFOLLOW"
> > >
> >
> >
> > Yes, I've realized that later on. We should definitely enforce O_NOFOLLOW
> > to avoid symlink escapes.
> >
> > Then comes the case of special files... A well-known case is the FIFO that
> > causes openat() to block as described in my response. FWIW, we addressed
> > this one in 9P by adding O_NONBLOCK and fixing the flags to the client
> > expectation with fcntl(F_SETFL). But this is just a protection against
> > being blocked. Blindly opening a special file can lead to any kind of
> > troubles you can think of... so it really looks that the only sane way
> > to be safe from such an attack is to forbid openat() of special files at
> > the filesystem level.
>
> Another solution specifically for O_CREAT without O_EXCL would be to
> turn it into an exclusive create.
Would this added O_EXCL then appear on the client side, e.g. to
guest userspace doing fcntl(F_GETFL) ?
> If that fails with EEXIST then try
> the normal open path (open with O_PATH, fstat, open proc symlink). If
open(O_PATH | O_NOFOLLOW) + fstatat(AT_EMPTY_PATH|AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
would indeed allow to filter out anything that isn't a directory and
to safely open the proc symlink.
> that fails with ENOENT, then retry the whole thing a certain number of
Indeed someone could have unlinked the file in the meantime, in which
case the open(O_PATH | O_NOFOLLOW) would fail, but if it succeeds then
we cannot hit ENOENT anymore AFAICT.
> times. If it still fails then somebody is definitely messing with us
> and we can fail the request with EIO.
>
Not sure what the retry+timeout is trying to mitigate here... why not
returning EIO right away ?
> Rather ugly, but I can't think of anything better.
>
> Thanks,
> Miklos
>
