On 04.12.20 06:44, David Gibson wrote:
> A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the
> hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order
> to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor.
>
> AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has
> its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism
> to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection
> level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected
> execution environment.
>
> The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each
> platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem
> ideal for users, or particularly for management layers.
>
> AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option
> "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other
> than SEV.
>
> This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration
> for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's
> "memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a
> "securable-guest-memory" property pointing to a platform specific
Can we do "securable-guest" ?
s390x also protects registers and integrity. memory is only one piece
of the puzzle and what we protect might differ from platform to
platform.
