On 4/24/20 7:54 AM, Kevin Wolf wrote:
If BDRV_REQ_ZERO_WRITE is set and we're extending the image, calling
qcow2_cluster_zeroize() with flags=0 does the right thing: It doesn't
undo any previous preallocation, but just adds the zero flag to all
relevant L2 entries. If an external data file is in use, a write_zeroes
request to the data file is made instead.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kw...@redhat.com>
---
block/qcow2-cluster.c | 2 +-
block/qcow2.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+++ b/block/qcow2.c
@@ -1726,6 +1726,7 @@ static int coroutine_fn qcow2_do_open(BlockDriverState
*bs, QDict *options,
bs->supported_zero_flags = header.version >= 3 ?
BDRV_REQ_MAY_UNMAP | BDRV_REQ_NO_FALLBACK : 0;
+ bs->supported_truncate_flags = BDRV_REQ_ZERO_WRITE;
Is this really what we want for encrypted files, or would it be better as:
if (bs->encrypted) {
bs->supported_truncate_flags = 0;
} else {
bs->supported_truncate_flags = BDRV_REQ_ZERO_WRITE;
}
At the qcow2 level, we can guarantee a read of 0 even for an encrypted
image, but is that really what we want? Is setting the qcow2 zero flag
on the cluster done at the decrypted level (at which point we may be
leaking information about guest contents via anyone that can read the
qcow2 metadata) or at the encrypted level (at which point it's useless
information, because knowing the underlying file reads as zero still
decrypts into garbage)?
--
Eric Blake, Principal Software Engineer
Red Hat, Inc. +1-919-301-3226
Virtualization: qemu.org | libvirt.org
