Lets add some documentation for the Protected VM functionality. Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <fran...@linux.ibm.com> --- docs/system/index.rst | 1 + docs/system/protvirt.rst | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+) create mode 100644 docs/system/protvirt.rst
diff --git a/docs/system/index.rst b/docs/system/index.rst index 6e5f20fa1333ce23..74afbd7cc3fc0296 100644 --- a/docs/system/index.rst +++ b/docs/system/index.rst @@ -34,3 +34,4 @@ Contents: deprecated build-platforms license + protvirt diff --git a/docs/system/protvirt.rst b/docs/system/protvirt.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000..6c8cf0f7910eae86 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/system/protvirt.rst @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +Protected Virtualization on s390x +================================= + +The memory and most of the registers of Protected Virtual Machines +(PVMs) are encrypted or inaccessible to the hypervisor, effectively +prohibiting VM introspection when the VM is running. At rest, PVMs are +encrypted and can only be decrypted by the firmware, represented by an +entity called Ultravisor, of specific IBM Z machines. + + +Prerequisites +------------- + +To run PVMs a machine with the Protected Virtualization feature +which is indicated by the Ultravisor Call facility (stfle bit +158) is required. The Ultravisor needs to be initialized at boot by +setting `prot_virt=1` on the kernel command line. + +If those requirements are met, the capability `KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED` +will indicate that KVM can support PVMs on that LPAR. + + +QEMU Settings +------------- + +To indicate to the VM that it can transition into protected mode, the +`Unpack facility` (stfle bit 161 represented by the feature +`S390_FEAT_UNPACK`) needs to be part of the cpu model of the VM. + +All I/O devices need to use the IOMMU. +Passthrough (vfio) devices are currently not supported. + +Host huge page backings are not supported. However guests can use huge +pages as indicated by its facilities. + + +Boot Process +------------ + +A secure guest image can either be loaded from disk or supplied on the +QEMU command line. Booting from disk is done by the unmodified +s390-ccw BIOS. I.e., the bootmap is interpreted, multiple components +are read into memory and control is transferred to one of the +components (zipl stage3). Stag3 does some fixups and then transfers +control to some program residing in guest memory, which is normally +the OS kernel. The secure image has another component prepended +(stage3a) that uses the new diag308 subcodes 8 and 10 to trigger the +transition into secure mode. + +Booting from the image supplied via the QEMU command line requires +that the file passed via -kernel has the same memory layout as would +result from the disk boot. This memory layout includes the encrypted +components (kernel, initrd, cmdline), the stage3a loader and +metadata. In case this boot method is used, the command line +options -initrd and -cmdline are ineffective. The preparation of a PVM +image is done by genprotimg of the s390-tools package. -- 2.25.1