On Thu, 21 Nov 2019 12:04:58 -0600 Eric Blake <ebl...@redhat.com> wrote:
> On 11/21/19 11:49 AM, Lukas Straub wrote: > > If we remove the child with the highest index from the quorum, > > decrement s->next_child_index. This way we get stable children > > names as long as we only remove the last child. > > > > Signed-off-by: Lukas Straub <lukasstra...@web.de> > > --- > > block/quorum.c | 6 ++++++ > > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) > > > > diff --git a/block/quorum.c b/block/quorum.c > > index df68adcfaa..6100d4108a 100644 > > --- a/block/quorum.c > > +++ b/block/quorum.c > > @@ -1054,6 +1054,12 @@ static void quorum_del_child(BlockDriverState *bs, > > BdrvChild *child, > > /* We know now that num_children > threshold, so blkverify must be > > false */ > > assert(!s->is_blkverify); > > > > + unsigned child_id; > > + sscanf(child->name, "children.%u", &child_id); > > sscanf() cannot detect overflow. Do we trust our input enough to ignore > this shortfall in the interface, or should we be using saner interfaces > like qemu_strtoul()? For that matter, why do we have to reparse > something; is it not already available somewhere in numerical form? Hi, Yes, I wondered about that too, but found no other way. But the input is trusted, AFAIK the only way to add child nodes is trough quorum_add_child above and quorum_open and there already are adequate checks there. > > + if (child_id == s->next_child_index - 1) { > > + s->next_child_index--; > > + } > > + > > bdrv_drained_begin(bs); > > > > /* We can safely remove this child now */ > > -- > > 2.20.1 > > > > >