On 30 August 2016 at 18:10, Greg Kurz <gr...@kaod.org> wrote: > As reported by Felix Wilhelm, at various places in 9pfs, full paths are > created by concatenating a guest originated string to the export path. A > malicious guest could forge a relative path and access files outside the > export path. > > A tentative fix was sent recently by Prasad J Pandit, but it was only > focused on the local backend and did not get a positive review. This series > tries to address the issue more globally, based on the official 9P spec. > > I wasn't running the TUXERA test suite correctly and overlooked a failure > with symbolic links (thanks Aneesh for your assistance). This v4 is basically > the same as v3 with a change in patch 1/3. > > --- > > Greg Kurz (3): > 9pfs: forbid illegal path names > 9pfs: forbid . and .. in file names > 9pfs: handle walk of ".." in the root directory
I see the cover letter and patches 1 and 2 in my email client and in patchwork. Where is patch 3? (If it's identical to the v3 patch 3 I can get that...) thanks -- PMM
