On Fri, 19 Feb 2016, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> commit 428c3ece97179557f2753071fb0ca97a03437267 ("fix MSI injection on Xen")
> inadvertently enabled the xen-specific logic unconditionally.
> Limit it to only when xen is enabled.
> Additionally, msix data should be read with pci_get_log
> since the format is pci little-endian.
>
> Reported-by: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berra...@redhat.com>
> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabell...@eu.citrix.com>
> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <m...@redhat.com>
the follow up patch is missing from the pull request:
http://marc.info/?l=xen-devel&m=145553838801725&w=2
> hw/pci/msix.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/hw/pci/msix.c b/hw/pci/msix.c
> index eb4ef11..537fdba 100644
> --- a/hw/pci/msix.c
> +++ b/hw/pci/msix.c
> @@ -80,10 +80,10 @@ static void msix_clr_pending(PCIDevice *dev, int vector)
> static bool msix_vector_masked(PCIDevice *dev, unsigned int vector, bool
> fmask)
> {
> unsigned offset = vector * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE;
> - uint32_t *data = (uint32_t *)&dev->msix_table[offset +
> PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_DATA];
> + uint8_t *data = &dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_DATA];
> /* MSIs on Xen can be remapped into pirqs. In those cases, masking
> * and unmasking go through the PV evtchn path. */
> - if (xen_is_pirq_msi(*data)) {
> + if (xen_enabled() && xen_is_pirq_msi(pci_get_long(data))) {
> return false;
> }
> return fmask || dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL] &
> --
> MST
>
