Hello,
An OOB r/w access issue was reported by Mr Gerben Lubbe(CC'd here).
The GDB(1) stub protocol supports commands 'm/M' to read & write 'len' bytes
from/to the stub memory area. In that, the 'len' parameter value supplied by
the host gdb(1) is not validated against the local buffer size. Which in turn
could lead to OOB r/w memory access.
Below is a proposed patch to fix this issue.
===
From 88edb457a66f8ff96209a1603914171eade0658b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Prasad J Pandit <p...@fedoraproject.org>
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2015 22:56:41 +0530
Subject: Limit memory r/w length to buffer size
GDB(1) stub communication protocol supports commands m/M to read
and write 'len' bytes from/to the stub memory area.
m addr,len : read 'len' bytes from address 'addr'
M addr,len:<data> : write 'len' bytes of 'data' to 'addr'
Qemu stub uses automatic buffers of size 'MAX_PACKET_LENGTH=4096'
to process these commands. Limit 'len' parameter value supplied
by the host gdb(1) to the maximum buffer size to avoid any OOB
buffer access.
Reported-by: Gerben van der Lubbe <spoofedexiste...@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <p...@fedoraproject.org>
---
gdbstub.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/gdbstub.c b/gdbstub.c
index ffe7e6e..39da736 100644
--- a/gdbstub.c
+++ b/gdbstub.c
@@ -956,6 +956,7 @@ static int gdb_handle_packet(GDBState *s, const char
*line_buf)
if (*p == ',')
p++;
len = strtoull(p, NULL, 16);
+ len = len > MAX_PACKET_LENGTH ? MAX_PACKET_LENGTH : len;
if (target_memory_rw_debug(s->g_cpu, addr, mem_buf, len, false) != 0) {
put_packet (s, "E14");
} else {
@@ -968,6 +969,7 @@ static int gdb_handle_packet(GDBState *s, const char
*line_buf)
if (*p == ',')
p++;
len = strtoull(p, (char **)&p, 16);
+ len = len > MAX_PACKET_LENGTH ? MAX_PACKET_LENGTH : len;
if (*p == ':')
p++;
hextomem(mem_buf, p, len);
--
2.4.3
===
Thank you.
--
Prasad J Pandit / Red Hat Product Security Team
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