On 10/28/2014 10:03 AM, Markus Armbruster wrote: > If the user neglects to specify the image format, QEMU probes the > image to guess it automatically, for convenience. > > Relying on format probing is insecure for raw images (CVE-2008-2004). > If the guest writes a suitable header to the device, the next probe > will recognize a format chosen by the guest. A malicious guest can > abuse this to gain access to host files, e.g. by crafting a QCOW2 > header with backing file /etc/shadow. > > Commit 1e72d3b (April 2008) provided -drive parameter format to let > users disable probing. Commit f965509 (March 2009) extended QCOW2 to > optionally store the backing file format, to let users disable backing > file probing. QED has had a flag to suppress probing since the > beginning (2010), set whenever a raw backing file is assigned.
May also be worth mentioning libvirt CVE-2010-2237, CVE-2010-2238,
CVE-2010-2239, when libvirt was (mostly) patched to fix probing mishaps
by defaulting to refusing to probe by default. And as you say, we keep
discovering variations on the theme (as recently as this year, I patched
a bug where libvirt accidentally probes during a drive-mirror operation
even when the user had explicitly marked an image as raw, although it
was not given a CVE because of libvirt's default to refuse to probe).
>
> Despite all this work (and time!), we're still insecure by default. I
> think we're doing our users a disservice by sticking to the fatally
> flawed probing. "Broken by default" is just wrong, and "convenience"
> is no excuse.
>
> I believe we can retain 90% of the convenience without compromising
> security by keying on image file name instead of image contents: if
> the file name ends in .img or .iso, assume raw, if it ends in .qcow2,
> assume qcow2, and so forth.
>
> Naturally, this would break command lines where the filename doesn't
> provide the correct clue. So don't do it just yet, only warn if the
> the change would lead to a different result. Looks like this:
>
> qemu: -drive file=my.img: warning: insecure format probing of image
> 'my.img'
> To get rid of this warning, specify format=qcow2 explicitly, or change
> the image name to end with '.qcow2'
>
> This should steer users away from insecure format probing. After a
> suitable grace period, we can hopefully drop format probing
> alltogether.
s/alltogether/altogether/
>
> Example 0: file=WHATEVER,format=F
>
> Never warns, because the explicit format suppresses probing.
Good, because this is what libvirt tries to use most of the time.
>
> Example 1: file=FOO.img
>
> Warns when probing of FOO.img results in anything but raw. In
> particular, it warns when the guest just p0wned you.
Warning will be a false positive if the user misnamed their
intentionally-created qcow2 file, but that's okay; the warning message
tells them how to fix their setup. However, I agree that most users
pick .img or .iso for raw files, so when the probe finds something other
than raw that the warning is worth it; better to catch the real problems
in spite of the false negatives.
>
> Example 2: file=FOO.qcow2 with backing file name FOO.img and no
> backing image format.
>
> Warns when probing of FOO.qcow2 results in anything but qcow2, or
> probing of FOO.img results in anything but raw.
It's nice that it only warns the user when the probe came back with
confusing results, while maintaining the convenience factor (no warning
if probe matched expectations). But this means the user is set up for
late failure.
Would it be any smarter to teach tools to automatically write in a
backing format for any image that probed correctly where the backing
format had not been previously recorded? That is, if we are opening
FOO.qcow2 for writing and it currently claims backing file BAR.img and
no format, then before closing FOO.qcow2 we also write the backing
format of raw into the metadata. That way, the next time we open
FOO.qcow2, we no longer have to probe BAR.img, and are ensured that we
are reading the backing file with the same format as previously. (When
opening FOO.qcow2 read-only, we don't have that luxury). In other
words, while we may still need to probe the TOP level file every time it
is opened (for convenience for users that don't type the format on the
command line every time), we should at LEAST minimize probing backing
files to the just the first try.
Not shown - what is the error message when a file extension that
normally indicates a non-raw file comes up raw? That is, if 'FOO.qcow2'
does not actually contain qcow2, is that also worth a warning to the
user? What happens where we don't have a file extension (such as when
using block device names to hold qcow2 files, where there is no '.' in
the name)?
>
> This patch is RFC because of open questions:
>
> * Should tools warn, too? Probing isn't insecure there, but a "this
> may pick a different format in the future" warning may be
> appropriate.
Yes. For precedent, libvirt can be considered a tool on images for
certain operations, and libvirt has been warning about probing since 2010.
Also, while I agree that any tool that operates on ONLY one layer of an
image, without ever trying to chase backing chains, can't be tricked
into opening wrong files, I'm not sure I agree with the claim that
"probing isn't insecure" -
>
> * I didn't specify recognized extensions for formats "bochs", "cloop",
> "parallels", "vpc", because I have no idea which ones to recognize.
Fair enough. If there are common enough extensions for a given format,
I'm sure people can request they be recognized as future patches.
>
> Additionally, some tests still need to be updated.
>
> Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <arm...@redhat.com>
> ---
> block.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> block/dmg.c | 1 +
> block/qcow.c | 1 +
> block/qcow2.c | 1 +
> block/qed.c | 1 +
> block/raw_bsd.c | 1 +
> block/vdi.c | 1 +
> block/vhdx.c | 1 +
> block/vmdk.c | 1 +
> include/block/block_int.h | 1 +
> 10 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/block.c b/block.c
> index 8da6e61..7a1c592 100644
> --- a/block.c
> +++ b/block.c
> @@ -674,10 +674,37 @@ static BlockDriver *bdrv_probe_all(const uint8_t *buf,
> int buf_size,
> return drv;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Guess image format from file name @fname
> + */
> +static BlockDriver *bdrv_guess_format(const char *fname)
> +{
> + BlockDriver *d;
> + int i, ext;
> + size_t fn_len = strlen(fname);
> + size_t ext_len;
> +
> + QLIST_FOREACH(d, &bdrv_drivers, list) {
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(d->fname_ext) && d->fname_ext[i]; i++) {
> + ext_len = strlen(d->fname_ext[i]);
> + if (fn_len <= ext_len) {
> + continue;
> + }
> + ext = fn_len - ext_len;
> + if (fname[ext - 1] == '.'
> + && !strcmp(fname + ext, d->fname_ext[i])) {
> + return d;
What happens if more than one format tends to pick the same extension?
For example, would you consider '.qcow' a typical extension for qcow2
files, even though it would probably match the older qcow driver first?...
> +++ b/include/block/block_int.h
> @@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ struct BlockDriver {
>
> int (*bdrv_probe)(const uint8_t *buf, int buf_size, const char
> *filename);
> int (*bdrv_probe_device)(const char *filename);
> + const char *fname_ext[2];
...Answering myself - so far, you haven't included any collision extensions.
Overall, I like the idea of this patch, but still wonder if we can do
better with the auto-amending of writable image metadata to record
anything that we ever learned from an initial probe.
--
Eric Blake eblake redhat com +1-919-301-3266
Libvirt virtualization library http://libvirt.org
signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
