CVE-2013-4542 hw/scsi/scsi-bus.c invokes load_request.
virtio_scsi_load_request does: qemu_get_buffer(f, (unsigned char *)&req->elem, sizeof(req->elem)); this probably can make elem invalid, for example, make in_num or out_num huge, then: virtio_scsi_parse_req(s, vs->cmd_vqs[n], req); will do: if (req->elem.out_num > 1) { qemu_sgl_init_external(req, &req->elem.out_sg[1], &req->elem.out_addr[1], req->elem.out_num - 1); } else { qemu_sgl_init_external(req, &req->elem.in_sg[1], &req->elem.in_addr[1], req->elem.in_num - 1); } and this will access out of array bounds. suggested patch: Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <m...@redhat.com> --- hw/scsi/virtio-scsi.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/hw/scsi/virtio-scsi.c b/hw/scsi/virtio-scsi.c index 26d95a1..51cc929 100644 --- a/hw/scsi/virtio-scsi.c +++ b/hw/scsi/virtio-scsi.c @@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ static void *virtio_scsi_load_request(QEMUFile *f, SCSIRequest *sreq) qemu_get_be32s(f, &n); assert(n < vs->conf.num_queues); qemu_get_buffer(f, (unsigned char *)&req->elem, sizeof(req->elem)); + assert(req->elem.in_num <= ARRAY_SIZE(req->elem.in_sg)); + assert(req->elem.out_num <= ARRAY_SIZE(req->elem.out_sg)); virtio_scsi_parse_req(s, vs->cmd_vqs[n], req); scsi_req_ref(sreq); -- MST