From: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.ku...@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
With mapped security models like mapped-xattr and mapped-file, we save the
symlink target as file contents. Now if we ever expose a normal directory
with mapped security model and find real symlinks in export path, never
follow them and return proper error.
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefa...@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.ku...@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit aed858ce10ef09c7bdf03f73e75e772f567c74cd)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdr...@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
hw/9pfs/virtio-9p-local.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/hw/9pfs/virtio-9p-local.c b/hw/9pfs/virtio-9p-local.c
index 6ece6f7..87aa75d 100644
--- a/hw/9pfs/virtio-9p-local.c
+++ b/hw/9pfs/virtio-9p-local.c
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static ssize_t local_readlink(FsContext *fs_ctx, V9fsPath
*fs_path,
if ((fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED) ||
(fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE)) {
int fd;
- fd = open(rpath(fs_ctx, path, buffer), O_RDONLY);
+ fd = open(rpath(fs_ctx, path, buffer), O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW);
if (fd == -1) {
return -1;
}
--
1.7.9.5
