Update the header makes it different from the original kernel that user provides via "-kernel", which leads to a different hash and breaks the attestation, e.g., for TDX.
We already skip it for SEV VMs. Instead of adding another check of is_tdx_vm() to cover the TDX case, check machine->cgs to cover all the confidential computing case for x86. Reported-by: Vikrant Garg <vikrant1g...@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao...@intel.com> --- hw/i386/x86-common.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/hw/i386/x86-common.c b/hw/i386/x86-common.c index b1b5f11e7396..7512be64d67b 100644 --- a/hw/i386/x86-common.c +++ b/hw/i386/x86-common.c @@ -952,7 +952,7 @@ void x86_load_linux(X86MachineState *x86ms, * kernel on the other side of the fw_cfg interface matches the hash of the * file the user passed in. */ - if (!sev_enabled() && protocol > 0) { + if (!MACHINE(x86ms)->cgs && protocol > 0) { memcpy(setup, header, MIN(sizeof(header), setup_size)); } -- 2.43.0