From: Markus Armbruster <arm...@redhat.com>
ATR size exceeding the limit is diagnosed, but then we merrily use it
anyway, overrunning card->atr[].
The message is read from a character device. Obvious security
implications unless the other end of the character device is trusted.
Spotted by Coverity. CVE-2011-4111.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <arm...@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aligu...@us.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7e62255a4b3e0e2ab84a3ec7398640e8ed58620a)
Signed-off-by: Bruce Rogers <brog...@suse.com>
[AF: Fixes BNC#731086.]
Signed-off-by: Andreas Färber <afaer...@suse.de>
---
hw/ccid-card-passthru.c | 1 +
1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/ccid-card-passthru.c b/hw/ccid-card-passthru.c
index 28eb9d1..0505663 100644
--- a/hw/ccid-card-passthru.c
+++ b/hw/ccid-card-passthru.c
@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ static void ccid_card_vscard_handle_message(PassthruState
*card,
error_report("ATR size exceeds spec, ignoring");
ccid_card_vscard_send_error(card, scr_msg_header->reader_id,
VSC_GENERAL_ERROR);
+ break;
}
memcpy(card->atr, data, scr_msg_header->length);
card->atr_length = scr_msg_header->length;
--
1.7.7
