Thomas Bellman wrote:
That might not be the best idea... Suddenly the chroot:ed
program has access to the real /usr/bin; and since it likely is
running as root (it was allowed to call chroot()), it can do bad
things to the things in /usr/bin.
If a chrooted process is running as root, it can very easily break out
of the chroot anyway. So...
Also remember, a chroot:ing process should permanently relinquish
its privileges as soon as possible after chroot:ing. There are
way too many fun things a root-running process can do even when
chroot:ed, like creating device files or setuid binaries.
...this is imperative.
All this is of course assuming that the chroot is done for
security reasons.
But here's something that might be interesting:
http://kerneltrap.org/Linux/Abusing_chroot
Short story: chroot is not and never has been a security tool.
-- Remy
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