"Wayne Brehaut" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Sun, 15 Jul 2007 17:37:13 -0400, Steve Holden <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > wrote: > > >Wayne Brehaut wrote: > >> On Fri, 13 Jul 2007 14:32:03 -0700, "[EMAIL PROTECTED]"
8< ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Also, I tend to follow the general Evolutionarily Stable Strategy > generally called "Retaliator". In the simple game of Hawk vs. Dove a > Hawk always attacks and defends to the death, whereas a Dove always > runs. A mixed strategy would be to sometimes attack-and-defend and > sometimes run, and a special case is to always run except when you're > attacked--then defend to the death; i.e., behave like a Dove to a Dove > and like a Hawk to a Hawk. > > In Game Theory, if not in practice, Retaliator is dominant over both > pure Hawk and pure Dove, partly because some who present like Hawks > are actually Bullies--who behave like Hawks until an opponent defends, > then behave like Doves. *grin* - you realise of course, that this stated strategy leaves you wide open to trolls of the "Lets see what we can provoke him into responding" kind - from people whose sense of humour is either subtle, or evil... - Hendrik -- http://mail.python.org/mailman/listinfo/python-list
