In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Laurent Pointal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> . >> . >> . >>>>> there's the security issue that really worries me. . . I have to be >>>>> able to limit what the interpreter can execute. I can't have my users . . . >>> I Agree with F.Bayer, when reading OP post, I immediatly think about Lua. >> >> Does Lua have an appropriate security model--a sandbox or such? >> Fond though I am of Lua, such would be news to me. > >I dont think of a security model like in Java, but in the possibility to >limit the accessible libraries for interpreted code. > > http://www.lua.org/manual/5.1/manual.html#5 > >If OP just need some computation logic, he could limit external world >communication libraries (these libraries must be loaded by the C host >program before being usable by scripts). >Need to look more precisely to the minimum library set to load and to >available functions in this set. Maybe it is possible to remove some >undesired functions from Lua symbol tables just after loading libraries. > > >[note: I have still not used Lua, but I look at it for futur use in a >current development where an embedded Python would be too heavy and make >problems relative to the GIL - but I'm still a Python fan in other use >cases] . . . I agree that Lua has a nice collection of primitives, and there certainly is scope for security-related programming. There isn't a body of work or precedent for polished results in this area, though, ...
Good luck with the future use you anticipate. -- http://mail.python.org/mailman/listinfo/python-list