Asia Security Initiative
Guest Post: Rohaiza Asi on Conflict in Maluku Posted by Matthew Shannon Stumpf on November 6, 2009. Filed under Indonesia, Internal Conflict & Crises. The following is a guest post by Rohaiza Asi, Project Officer at the HD Centre in Singapore. Conflict Management Strategies in Maluku: Learning from the Maluku Experience Report of the Ambon Workshop, 14 October 2009 On Wednesday, 14th October 2009, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre) together with the Indonesian Institut Titian Perdamaian (ITP), and with the assistance of Insitut Tifa Damai Maluku, held a one day workshop in Ambon on “Conflict Management Strategies in Maluku: Learning from the Maluku Experience.” Organised with the support of the Embassy of the Government of Canada in Indonesia, the workshop brought together representatives from the various local government agencies, NGOs, academics, religious and traditional leaders, to discuss conflict management strategies in Maluku and the progress towards reconciliation and reconstruction that has been achieved to date since the outbreak of the violent conflict in 1999. The Regional Secretary (Sekda) of Maluku province delivered a opening address. The Second Secretary from the Canadian Embassy in Jakarta, Alyssa Melon, was also present. The workshop, the first in a series of three workshops, will contribute to the HD Centre’s ongoing project titled, “Comparative Perspectives on Conflict Management in Asia”, being implemented as part of the Asia Security Initiative of the MacArthur Foundation. This research project will generate new analysis on conflict management and prevention possibilities in Indonesia (as well as India and the Philippines). The last two workshops will be held in Central Sulawesi and West Kalimantan by mid-2010. Maluku was the centre of one of Indonesia’s most vicious communal conflicts in the post-Soeharto era. With the fall of Soeharto’s regime in 1998, a combination of emerging democracy, weak government institutions and the absence of charismatic leadership paved the way for dissent and bold secessionist demands. A heterogeneous Indonesian population and the archipelagic state’s particularly isolating geography contributed to problems of effective governance. Maluku, like many conflict areas in Indonesia, did not erupt overnight. Rather, the outbreak of violence was attributed to grievances that were suppressed for many years. Inter-religious violence and riots broke out in Ambon after a seemingly petty dispute between an Ambonese bus driver and a passenger (of different religion) erupted into full scale violence in January 1999. The end of the conflict in Maluku in 2002 came with the signing of the Malino II Accord that called for truce between the Christian and the Muslim community in Maluku. The conflict, which spanned more than 3 years, resulted in an estimated 5000 deaths and as many as 500, 000 displaced people. The presence of officials from the Department of Social (Dinas) and the Ministry of Home Affairs (Depdagri) enabled an exchange of information and opinion with non-government actors. There was consensus that Maluku has not fully recovered from the violent conflict and is still in the peace building phase. “The conflict (in Maluku) is a state crime against the people of Maluku.”- Workshop’s participant. Most of the participants expressed the view that the Maluku conflict was never over religious difference, but reflective of a clash of vested interests at the elite level in Jakarta exploiting religious differences. Participants were particularly critical of the role of the military and the police whom they believed were responsible for inciting the conflict. In addition, the resulting impact of the conflict had left several long term repercussions on the local community particularly on the younger generation. For instance, children tend to view the military and police officers in high regard. When once asked what their ambition is, many would say doctor or lawyer, for instance, now it is more common for them to say soldier or police officer, and the resulting segregation has increased religious ignorance. Participants were generally critical of conflict management efforts to date and claimed that NGOs and civil societies have done more for the local community than the government. The top down approach of the Malino II Agreement was regarded as the turning point in the conflict. It was made possible because it was supported from below by numerous community based peacemaking initiatives. The key criticisms include: —There has been no proper implementation of the Malino II Agreement. —The findings of the independent investigation team, which was tasked with investigating the causes of conflict and major violent incidences, remain unpublished. —The local government’s approach to internally displaced people (IDPs) was and is more inclined towards relocation than reintegration. Although, the local government has allocated budget for reintegration, the program has not been implemented properly. —No coordination of peace building efforts among the different levels and types of government agencies and between government and non-government actors. Implementation of Presidential Instruction Scheme (Inpres) Number 6/2003, which allocates a huge amount of money from the Central Government to accelerate conflict recovery in Maluku, was cited as an example that there is no coordination between government at the provincial level and in the city (kota Ambon). —The local government is too focused on physical reconstruction as opposed to reconciliation and reintegration of the two religious communities. “The conflict management efforts in Maluku are like pieces of jigsaw puzzle that do not fit to form a big, coherent picture.”- Workshop’s participant. Several recommendations were put forward including: —Those from the central government and those involved in the negotiating teams in the signing of the Malino II Agreement should be held accountable for the implementation of the Agreement although participants were aware that this is a challenge because of political actors. —The need to develop and implement more effective approaches to dealing with IDPs. A representative of a local NGO told of the efforts of the non-government actors on their recommendation to People Consultative Council (DPR) to implement a regional law (perda) on the management of IDPs but this was turned down as based on the claim that IDPs are regarded as a temporary problem. However, in Maluku, the reality of IDPs has become permanent. Ten years after the conflict, many still refuse to return to their hometown due to the perception that government is unable to defend their rights and persisting trauma from the conflict. —There is a need for more vigorous consultation as well as coordination among different levels of government and between government and non-government actors on peace building and conflict management in Maluku. The lack of coordination usually means there is overlap of efforts or wastage of resources and the provision of assistance do not meet the needs of the local community. For instance, as part of conflict recovery, the provincial government decided to build a new school in kota Ambon without consulting the government officials in the city. However, there was no urgent need for a new school as the conflict has not affected the operation of an existing school in the area. As a result, the facilities of the new school were under-utilised. —The Indonesian government should move away from physical reconstruction to community empowerment and capacity building. What the local community needs is not more schools or nice buildings, for instance, but better education and training to empower the local communities namely in the economic sector. —All levels of government should address the problem of poverty and reduce youth unemployment; the group most vulnerable to external exploitation of religious divisions unless those energy and time are put to good use. —Regional autonomy should be better managed such that it allows for greater efficiency and not competition for resources between the different parts of Maluku that may produce conflict. The creation of new districts or areas may also heightened segregation. The most recent and controversial example of this is the case of Tual and Maluku Tenggara (Malra). In April 2007, a group of politicians lobbied for the creation of Tual as a municipality and thus, secedes from Malra. If this happened, Malra would be left with nothing as Tual is the urban centre with most facilities located there. Even though the main issue is competition over resources, Malra is on the periphery of an area that saw intense fighting between the Muslims and the Christians in 1999. If Tual secedes and depending on how the borders are drawn, it may leave Tual with a Muslim majority and Malra with a Christian majority and as with all pemekaran discussions in Maluku, the religio-politico calculus hovers in the background. The group, however, agreed there have been several positive efforts with regard to conflict management both during and after the conflict. The case of the Wayame village was cited as one of the success stories of community based conflict management. The village of Wayame was least affected by the conflict. Villagers came together, during the conflict, to form a team called Team 20 due to its composition of 10 Muslim and 10 Christians. This team was responsible for verifying any information aimed at provoking fighting between the two religious communities. Rules were also enforced in the village that no one is allowed to make derogatory remarks about religion. Baku Bae Movement is another community based initiative regarded highly for its peacemaking efforts and believed by many participants to have facilitated the signing of the Malino II Agreement. To date, there have also been numerous interfaith dialogues between the Christian and Muslim communities and other programmes to promote greater understanding between the two sides. The local government has also held several trainings for its staff on a range of issues relevant to women and children caught up in violent conflict. Women, have played significant roles at the community level in terms of conflict resolution and peace building, and have recently held the first Maluku Women Congress to discuss political, economic and social issues. In sum, it appears that while there are many ongoing conflict management efforts in Maluku, however a key concern is the lack of coordination between these efforts or programmes, resulting in an ineffective implementation and less than optimal outcomes. Outstanding problems such as the issues surrounding the status of IDPs, segregation between the two religious communities that still persist in some areas, and high percentage of unemployed youth have been cited as factors that can be exploited by actors to stoke the fires of conflict. A challenge during the workshop was to keep the participants focused on the topic of conflict management initiatives to date and recommendations to improve these efforts. Participants seemed preoccupied with the multiple causes of the conflict and the problems that arose during the conflict as well as pointing fingers at the actors responsible for the deterioration of situation. It appears that they have yet to achieve closure on the conflict and its aftermath and this itself is an issue that has to be addressed in order to achieve sustainable peace in Maluku. http://asiasecurity.macfound.org/blog/entry/111guest_post_rohaiza_asi_on_conflict_in_maluku/ MacArthur’s Asia Security Initiative grantmaking guidelines. © John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. All rights reserved.
