On Sep 11, 2013, at 21:52, Viktor Dukhovni <postfix-us...@dukhovni.org> wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 11, 2013 at 09:39:57PM +0200, DTNX Postmaster wrote:
> 
>>> This is more reasonable, provided systems you send mail to all
>>> support TLSv1 and up.  What fraction of outbound handshakes end up
>>> with SSLv3?
>> 
>> Outbound is an even smaller percentage of total TLS connections
>> established in August; 0,0002%. Interestingly, they are both banks;
>> one Dutch, and one Swiss. Both using SSLv3 with AES256-SHA, wouldn't
>> be surprised if that means they are using the same brand of security
>> product.
> 
> For many large organizations inbound and outbound email are handled
> by completely separate infrastructure.  Inbound mail is often first
> received by various anti-spam appliances.  Outbound mail often
> bypasses these, and for bulk transactional mail, may be handled by
> other appliances that handle deliverability tracking, ...

Ahh, yes. It's the same IP address, but that could just as well be the 
firewall itself that fronts multiple devices.

>> The odd thing is that both banks drop to RC4-MD5 when sending to
>> us. I've seen this on another product that we support ourselves as
>> well; the Postfix client negotiates a higher protocol level and
>> better cipher for outgoing mail than the server does for incoming
>> mail. There is probably a good reason for this, but it feels to me
>> like they should support the same protocol and cipher level regardless
>> of direction?
> 
> I am not surprised.

In our own case though this is with current software, a direct 
connection without firewall tomfoolery and whatnot. I shall see if 
their support department can explain it to me and satisfy my curiosity 
as to what causes the difference.

>> Re-enabled SSLv3 for incoming connections again, by the way;
>> turns out that about half of those incoming connections are from
>> an outsourcing firm that handles payment notifications for, yes,
>> another Dutch bank. Sigh ;-)
> 
> As I mentioned, at this time, deprecating SSLv3 is most likely
> counter-productive.  I am hoping that in a couple of years it will
> be a practical default for the SMTP client only, where you can
> define exceptions for problem destinations via smtp_tls_policy_maps.
> 
> A polite note to their postmaster linking to this thread may
> encourage them to start making plans to upgrade to inbound systems
> that can support TLSv1 and up (strictly speaking the STARTTLS EHLO
> response in SMTP promises support of TLS an IETF standard, not SSLv3).

Noted. In our experience however the postmaster account rarely works, 
and if it does you run into a mess of red tape where even the most 
simple change requires multiple signatures, several hours of consulting 
billed and whatnot.

Mvg,
Joni

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