On Thu, Dec 14, 2023 at 11:04:32AM +0100, Joachim Lindenberg via Postfix-users wrote:
> I´d say Viktor is biased towards 3 1 1. It isn't a bias, it is a rational recommendation. There are multiple issues with "2 1 1": - With a public issuer CA, you're adding a redundant trusted party, with generally rather weak domain validation (DV) certificate issuance mechanisms. - The underlying EE certificates are then subject to periodic expiration. Some operators invariably fail to rotate them on time. - A less common problem, but also unique to DANE-TA(2) is failure to match the hostname in the certificate. Some operators neglect to make sure that the TLSA base domain aligns with a DNS name in the certificate. - The CA operator can always surprise you with unexpected changes in their insfrastructure. - With "3 1 1" *you* decide when to rotate your keys, pre-publish a "3 1 1" TLSA record matching next key, and then switch to that key once the TLSA record has been in place for a few TTLs. > You may call me biased towards 2 1 1 because I dislike pinning a key > that is supposed to rotate. You're always pinning a key, either the issuer CA's or the end-entity (EE) servers. Only poor ACME tooling gets in the way of key rotation with "3 1 1". If you can prepare a key in advance of a certificate rollover, prepublish the matching "3 1 1" and use that key conditionally on a prepublication timer having elapsed, then you get key rollover without introducing a redundant trusted third party or risking outages due to certificate expiration, name match failures, ... Each day, a handful of domains fail DANE validation, a large majority, because of botched Let's Encrypt integration, where the key rotation is not properly orchestrated. They'd be far better off with a "pinned" 3 1 1, that they rollover at their discretion, rather than let the ACME client break their mail system every 2 months. -- Viktor. _______________________________________________ Postfix-users mailing list -- postfix-users@postfix.org To unsubscribe send an email to postfix-users-le...@postfix.org