On Tue, Sep 26, 2023 at 10:49:30AM +0200, Eray Aslan via Postfix-users wrote:

> On Mon, Sep 25, 2023 at 05:51:05PM -0400, Viktor Dukhovni via Postfix-users 
> wrote:
> > Not, dangerous, just largely pointless, with *potential* complications,
> > unless there are servers that can actually make use of said
> > certificates.
> 
> Can a case be made for promoting anonymous ciphers? I feel they are
> under appreciated and under used. In a lot of use cases, authentication
> is done via another channel or even if there is a problem with the cert,
> you go ahead anyway. Only encryption is used and not authentication but
> we maintain the bits for auth anyway potentially causing problems.

Sure:

    https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7672#section-8.2

Sadly, AFAIK, none have yet been specified for TLS 1.3.  And the choices
for TLS 1.2 are somewhat limited (none with both AECDH and either GCM or
SHA-2 for example):

    
https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-4

    $ openssl ciphers -s -tls1_2 -v 
'ALL:!aRSA:!aECDSA:!aDSS:!SEED:!SRP:!PSK:@SECLEVEL=0'
    ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384   TLSv1.2 Kx=DH       Au=None Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD
    ADH-AES128-GCM-SHA256   TLSv1.2 Kx=DH       Au=None Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD
    ADH-AES256-SHA256       TLSv1.2 Kx=DH       Au=None Enc=AES(256)  Mac=SHA256
    ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA256  TLSv1.2 Kx=DH       Au=None Enc=Camellia(256) 
Mac=SHA256
    ADH-AES128-SHA256       TLSv1.2 Kx=DH       Au=None Enc=AES(128)  Mac=SHA256
    ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA256  TLSv1.2 Kx=DH       Au=None Enc=Camellia(128) 
Mac=SHA256
    AECDH-AES256-SHA        TLSv1 Kx=ECDH     Au=None Enc=AES(256)  Mac=SHA1
    ADH-AES256-SHA          SSLv3 Kx=DH       Au=None Enc=AES(256)  Mac=SHA1
    ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA     SSLv3 Kx=DH       Au=None Enc=Camellia(256) Mac=SHA1
    AECDH-AES128-SHA        TLSv1 Kx=ECDH     Au=None Enc=AES(128)  Mac=SHA1
    ADH-AES128-SHA          SSLv3 Kx=DH       Au=None Enc=AES(128)  Mac=SHA1
    ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA     SSLv3 Kx=DH       Au=None Enc=Camellia(128) Mac=SHA1

So the opportunity to use anonymous ciphers is slipping away.

With TLS 1.2, Postfix does use anon-ECDH or anon-DH ciphers when
mutually supported (e.g. Postfix client to Postfix server at
security levels "may" or "encrypt").  An example from my logs:

    Sep 25 18:09:58 amnesiac postfix/smtpd[66854]:
        Anonymous TLS connection established from 
mailer2.gandi.net[217.70.182.74]:
        TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)

    Sep 25 20:15:27 straasha postfix/smtpd[16441]:
        Anonymous TLS connection established from 
mail70-4z9c.e2ma.net[139.60.2.70]:
        TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)

"Anonymous" here just means no *client* cert, but the cipher name
"ADH-..." or "AECDH-..." is one that is certificate-free in both
directions.

There is typically little support in the IETF TLS working group for
adding more anonymous ciphers. 

-- 
    Viktor.
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