Dear all,

This term, Paolo Babbiotti and I will be running a reading group on Stanley 
Cavell's The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy. 
We will meet starting Week 2, and convene subsequently on a weekly basis from 
5-6 pm in the Graduate Common Room.

The aim of this reading group is to provide an occasion to encounter and engage 
with the American philosopher Stanley Cavell's magnum opus The Claim of Reason. 
Cavell's work, which grows out the tradition of ordinary language philosophy, 
is marked by its intensely personal and at times highly idiosyncratic style as 
well as its exceptionally broad range—his work ranges over language, 
aesthetics, ethics, politics, cinema, and theatre, and draws freely on a 
diverse cast of philosophical influences that include, among others, Austin, 
Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Emerson, Thoreau, and Freud. The central 
problematic of The Claim of Reason (and arguably of Cavell's entire 
philosophical career) is skepticism; by way of his incredibly rich, meandering 
discussions of language, politics, morality, and literature, Cavell traces and 
stakes in this work his unique understanding of skepticism as not so much a 
problem of epistemology but a problem "we live"—as a problem expressing certain 
(ethical, aesthetic, and political) difficulties that arise out of our 
existence with other people in the world.

Below are two links to:

1. the reading list (which includes a brief introduction to Cavell and The 
Claim of Reason)

https://www.dropbox.com/s/qbkyrqrt7r459lm/The%20Cavell%20Reading%20Group.docx?dl=0

...and...

2. a pdf copy of The Claim to Reason

https://www.dropbox.com/s/f2lmiricveocr7j/cavell%20the-claim-of-reason-wittgenstein-skepticism-morali.pdf?dl=0

Hope we can see some of you there!

Best
Yo and Paolo


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