Dear all, REMINDER: Today at the SMG we will have Yael Lowenstein (Cambridge JRF) presenting a talk entitled ‘Heim Sequences and Why Most Unqualified 'Would'-Counterfactuals are Not True’ (abstract below). As usual it will be from 4.30 to 6pm in the Philosophy Faculty Board Room. The talk should last about 45 minutes followed by questions and discussion. All graduate students are welcome.
A full list of speakers for Lent and Easter term is available here: https://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/seminars-phil/SMG Abstract: The problem of reverse Sobel sequences (alternatively known as “Heim sequences”) is taken by some to be an important objection to the classic Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals. Responses to the problem have been wide-ranging. Some (von Fintel, Gillies) have argued that the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics should be rejected, and a version of a strict conditional semantics, which better handles the troublesome sequences, should be endorsed in its place. Others (Karen Lewis, Ichikawa) have argued that the problem motivates a contextualist rendering of counterfactuals similar to contextualist accounts of knowledge or taste. And Moss has argued that there is a plausible, entirely pragmatic way to account for the (apparently) problematic sequences. It is my contention that none of these responses to the problem is right. After showing why I think each extant solution is inadequate, I defend a novel way to make sense of the troublesome sequences. The solution I endorse avoids the problems faced by the alternative analyses. In addition, there is good independent reason to think that it is right. There is, however, a difficulty for my view: its truth suggests that many ordinarily accepted counterfactuals are not true. I argue that this (apparent) cost is an acceptable one. Regards, Nathan Hawkins PhD student in Philosophy Cambridge University _____________________________________________________ To unsubscribe from the CamPhilEvents mailing list, or change your membership options, please visit the list information page: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEvents List archive: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEventsArchive Please note that CamPhilEvents doesn't accept email attachments. See the list information page for further details and suggested alternatives.
