> > The Philosophy Faculty is delighted to announce two presentations from Prof. > Arindam Chakrabarti (University of Hawaii) on Tuesday May 8th and Thursday > May 10th. All are welcome. > > > 1. Tuesday May 8th, 11.30 am to 1pm, Philosophy Faculty Board Room > > Paper: ‘On what there will be: C.D. Broad, Michael Dummett and the Reality of > the Future’ > > > 2. Thursday May 10th, 11 am to 1 pm, Philosophy Faculty Board Room > > Workshop: 'Self-Knowledge, Self-Ignorance, and the Body: Some classical and > modern Indian Theories and Queries’ > > A read-in-advance paper is likely to be available for the workshop, though > anyone is welcome to attend. Please write to Prof. Rae Langton for a copy > (rh...@cam.ac.uk <mailto:rh...@cam.ac.uk>). > > Biography: Professor Arindam Chakrabarti did his doctoral work in philosophy > of language at Oxford in early 1980s under Sir Peter Strawson and Sir Michael > Dummett. He has taught at University of Calcutta, University College London, > University of Delhi, and University of Hawaii for the last 21 years. From > this coming Fall 2018, he will occupy an endowed chair of Indic Humanities at > the Department of Philosophy, Stony Brook University, NY. He published > Denying Existence on the logic of singular negative existentials, from > Synthese Library Series in 1997, and has most recently edited the Bloomsbury > Research Handbook of Indian Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art. His next major > book Realisms Interlinked: Objects, Subjects and Other Subjects is > forthcoming from Bloomsbury by the end of 2018. > > > Abstracts: > > ‘On what there will be: C.D. Broad, Michael Dummett and the Reality of the > Future’. There have been at least four kinds of views among philosophers > about the reality of future individuals. First, there is Eternalism--- a sort > of spatialization of time—which treats past, present and future entities and > events as equally real. Both Quine and the ancient “omni-existentist” realist > Buddhists were of this opinion. Then, there is Neutralism, nowadays known as > The Growing Block theory, the view that the past and the present are real but > the future simply does not exist. C.D.Broad argued vehemently for such > anti-realism about the future claiming (in Scientific Thought,p77) that > statements which profess to be about the future “do not refer to anything and > therefore are not literally true or false”. Third there is Presentism the > view that only present truths are truths and only present existents truly > exist. To be, upon this view, is to be current. Finally, in the first century > AD Nyāyasūtras of Gautama we find report and refutation of a view that only > past and future events and stretches of time are real, the so-called present > is a spurious interval between the bygone and forthcoming. We could call it: > No-Presentism. In this paper, we shall examine the neutralist anti-realism > about the future in the metaphysical sense, in the reference-theoretic sense, > and most elaborately—following Michael Dummett—in the meaning-theoretic > sense. Dummett’s influential way of recasting a realism-debate as best > conducted through a debate about whether a truth-conditional or a > justificationist theory of meaning works best with respect to a certain > sector of statements, when applied to statements about the future, initially > seems to support the growing block theory which amounts to anti-realism about > the future. But I raise some serious questions regarding the basic assumption > of Dummettian anti-realism about the future: that knowledge of meaning must > be manifestable in a way that only justificationist theories of meaning can > account for. Future contingents or statements universally quantifying over > all future times are undecidable, hence we have no way of displaying our > knowledge of either their truth-conditions or their justification-conditions. > Yet, the fact that they are understood, shows that the manifestability > criterion of knowledge of meaning could not be accepted without begging the > question against realism. > > 'Self-Knowledge, Self-Ignorance, and the Body: Some classical and modern > Indian Theories and Queries’. Confessions of ignorance specifically about > oneself deserve careful phenomenological scrutiny. David Hume’s intimate > entry into “myself” resulted in his never catching “myself without a > perception”. Who was self-consciously registering the selflessness? In a > quite different sense, on certain occasions of retrospective reflection, I > clearly feel that I do not know myself. Apart from the unusual mistakes one > makes in phantom limb cases or due to pathological forgetfulness, repentance > about a past misdeed or self-censure can take the form of the feeling: “How > could I have done that? I do not know what made me do that kind of a thing!” > Self-knowledge can dawn gradually as one keeps detecting such pockets of > self-ignorance or correcting such errors about oneself. > “One’s own body is only half-perceived, the rest being eked out by > imagination” remarked the most original Indian philosopher of early 20th > century, K.C. Bhattacharya. In this paper K.C.B’s chapter on bodily > subjectivity, soaked in Kant and Advaita Vedānta will be the basis of our > reflections on bodily self-awareness, such as my knowledge of my own face or > back. Distinguishing between several other senses of self-awareness would > land us finally into classical Indian philosophical debates on the very > possibility of an awareness being reflexively aware of itself. > > Prābhākara Mīmāmsā defended a doctrine of triple awareness: whenever I see or > touch a flower, the flower, myself and my visual or tactile awareness of the > flower—all three are illuminated by the single awareness. Nyāya > epistemologists rejected this alleged self-luminosity of cognitions and > proposed a higher-order apperceptive account of inner perceptual cognition of > cognition. Yogācāra Buddhist philosophers such as Dignāga and Dharmakīrti > brought two kinds of infinite regress charges against this cognition of > cognition theory and argued that every momentary awareness made itself and > nothing but itself its own object. This led to an extreme internalism, > subjective idealism and a fictionalism about the self. In conclusion, the > paper will try to bring out the non-dualist Vedānta account of consciousness > as immediately and phenomenally self-available, as never known qua an object > but that by the light of which all else is known. > > > > ___________________ > Rae Langton, FBA, FAAAS, MAE > Knightbridge Professor of Philosophy > Faculty of Philosophy > Sidgwick Avenue > Cambridge CB3 9DA > > Newnham College > Sidgwick Avenue > Cambridge CB3 9DF > >
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