Dear all,

Just a reminder that tomorrow at the Moral Sciences Club, Susanna Siegel
will be giving a talk titled *Salience Norms*. This talk will be at 2.30 in
the Barbara White room in Newnham College (this is different to the
location of the two most recent meetings).

Note that there's a fee to attend MSC meetings. This can either be paid as
a yearly membership (£7.50 for students, £15 for others) or a one-off fee
for a single week's meeting (£2 students, £3 others). These can both be
paid online at
http://onlinesales.admin.cam.ac.uk/browse/extra_info.asp?compid=1&modid=1&catid=75&prodvarid=87
(alternatively,
these can be paid in cash on the day).

We look forward to seeing many of you there.

Best wishes,

Adam Bales and Daisy Dixon

*Abstract*
We evaluate newspapers according to two dimensions: whether their stories
are well-researched and accurate (did the reporter check their facts?), and
which stories they choose to print in the first place (are the stories
relevant to the public? newsworthy? important?). Could an analogous
distinction apply to the representational states in an individual's mind?
We use epistemic norms to evaluate beliefs according to whether they are
true and well-founded. But discussions of which thoughts should populate
the mind in the first place are far less common in epistemology. I discuss
whether there are norms of salience that apply to the mind, and if so, what
kinds of norms these might be.

--
Daisy Dixon and Adam Bales
Secretaries of the Moral Sciences Club
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Cambridge
[email protected]
http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/seminars-phil/seminars-msc
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