Dear All, This Thursday at the Serious Metaphysics Group, Carlo Rossi will be giving a talk titled 'Persisting things: their parts and places' (abstract below). We will meet in the philosophy faculty board room from 1:00-2:30.
Hope to see you there, Georgie Persisting things: their parts and places There are at least two ways in which a metaphysical debate can be deflated. According to the first and increasingly fashionable way, the dispute between two parties which disagree over a metaphysical matter could be deflated if each side can interpret the other side as speaking a language in which the latter’s asserted sentences are true (Hirsch 2009). According to the second way, a metaphysical dispute could be deflated if it is shown that both sides must either accept or deny the alleged metaphysical fact that initially set the two views apart. The first way of deflating a metaphysical debate is merely verbal; the second one is metaphysically substantial. The dispute between endurantists and perdurantists has often been seen as a dispute about the existence of temporal parts. Whereas perdurantists claim that ordinary material objects are *composed* of temporal parts, endurantists deny that claim. In this paper I argue against recent attempts of deflating this debate in a metaphysically substantial fashion (Donnelly 2010, 2011; Hofweber & Velleman 2011; Gilmore 2013) and raise a concern about the problems that this sort strategy might bring to alternative formulations of Endurance and Perdurance theory. -- Georgie Statham PhD Candidate Faculty of Philosophy University of Cambridge _____________________________________________________ To unsubscribe from the CamPhilEvents mailing list, or change your membership options, please visit the list information page: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEvents List archive: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEventsArchive Please note that CamPhilEvents doesn't accept email attachments. See the list information page for further details and suggested alternatives.
