Dear all,

The final meeting go the Moral Sciences Club for this term will be on
Tuesday 10th March, when Michael Blome-Tillman (Cambridge) will give a talk
entitled 'On Denoting and Referring' (abstract below). The talk will be in
the *Barbara White Room, *Newnham College, from 2.30-4.15pm. After the
talk, everyone is welcome to join us for tea and biscuits in the philosophy
faculty.

There's a small charge for attending a single meeting - £2 (students)/£3
(others) - or those wishing to become members can buy a subscription for
the rest of the academic year for £7.50/£15 (students/others).

We look forward to seeing many of you there.

Best wishes,

Ali Boyle and Matthew Simpson

Michael Blome-Tillman: On Denoting and Referring

According to Russell, definite descriptions are existentially quantified
noun phrases. Strawson (and Frege) famously disagreed: according to them,
definite descriptions such as ‘the F’ are singular terms, and utterances
containing them presuppose rather than entail that there is an F. In this
paper I argue that the debate between Russell and Strawson rests on a
mistaken assumption about the nature and role of presuppositions in natural
language. Once we get clearer on presuppositions, which are nowadays mostly
understood as conventional implicatures, the dispute evaporates and the way
is cleared for what I call ‘Presuppositional Russellianism’---a
surprisingly simple yet powerful view that combines the advantages of both
Russellian and Fregean theories within a unified semantic framework.

--
Ali Boyle and Matthew Simpson
Secretaries of the Moral Sciences Club
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Cambridge
[email protected]
http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/seminars-phil/seminars-msc
_____________________________________________________
To unsubscribe from the CamPhilEvents mailing list,
or change your membership options, please visit
the list information page: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEvents

List archive: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEventsArchive

Please note that CamPhilEvents doesn't accept email
attachments. See the list information page for further 
details and suggested alternatives.

Reply via email to