Dear all, The next meeting of the Serious Metaphysics Group will be on Thursday (the 19th). Adam Bales will be giving a talk titled 'Decision-theoretic impossibility proofs: an impossibility proof' (abstract below). As usual, we'll meet from 1:00 - 2:30pm in the Graduate Common Room in the Philosophy Faculty.
Hope to see you there, Georgie Decision-theoretic impossibility proofs: an impossibility proof By analogy with well-known impossibility proofs from social choice theory, Rachael Briggs has argued that no account of decision theory can do all that we would wish of it. Given this, Briggs thinks that we should be unsurprised, and perhaps unconcerned, about the existence of counterexamples to various prominent accounts of decision theory. Given that counterexamples play a key role in decision-theoretic discussions this result would, if successful, be a powerful one. In this talk, however, I will present three reasons to think that Briggs' argument fails, two of which give us reasons to doubt that further decision-theoretic impossibility proofs will be forthcoming. -- Georgie Statham PhD Candidate Faculty of Philosophy University of Cambridge _____________________________________________________ To unsubscribe from the CamPhilEvents mailing list, or change your membership options, please visit the list information page: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEvents List archive: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEventsArchive Please note that CamPhilEvents doesn't accept email attachments. See the list information page for further details and suggested alternatives.
