Dear all,

This Friday, Piotr Szalek will be at the final HPS Philosophy Workshop of this 
year, presenting his work on ‘Representationalism and Pragmatism’, at 12 noon 
in Seminar Room 1.

If you would like a copy of the reading Piotr has made available, please email 
me!

===

ABSTRACT

One of the most striking readings of Berkeley’s philosophy is offered by two 
founders of the classical American Pragmatism. Both Charles Sanders Peirce and 
William James regarded Berkeley as a pragmatist. The paper seeks to explain the 
alleged proto-pragmatist elements in Berkeley’s philosophy and to show how it 
reveals both origins and correlations between representationalism and 
pragmatism. The explanation will be offered in terms of the two famous 
Sellarsian categories of the ‘manifest’ and ‘scientific’ images of the world 
and human beings. The ‘manifest’ image is regarded as a refinement of the 
ordinary way of conceiving things, and the scientific image is seen as a 
theoretical picture of the world provided by science. The paper argues that the 
modern pragmatism could be seen as an effect of an attempt to synthesize the 
‘manifest’ and ‘scientific’ images by creating one unified synoptic vision of 
the world after the modern scientific revolution and the failure of the 
representationalism of Descartes and Locke as a part of a new conceptual 
framework within which these two images were supposed to be combined.

===

The HPS Philosophy Workshop, as I hope you all know, is a venue for junior 
members of the department to present drafts of their work-in-progress, and 
receive constructive criticism. Also there’s tea, coffee, and biscuits, as if 
you needed any more reason to join us.

All the best,
Toby Bryant
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