Dear all, This is a reminder that tomorrow Ian Proops (UT Austin) will give a talk entitled "Might I be Many? Kant on the Second Paralogism". An abstract is provided below.
The meeting will be held at 5:15 on Tuesday, 13 May, in the *Boys Smith Room *(found in the Fisher Building), St. John's College. For more information, including details about our fees, and the final two meetings of this academic year, please visit our website at http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/seminars-phil/seminars-msc. Finally, a reminder that on 20 May--the final meeting of the year--we will hold our AGM during which we will discuss a possible change to MSC meeting times. For those who will not be able to attend that meeting, please feel free to email us with any questions or concerns you may have on this matter. Best, Kyle Mitchell and Shyane Siriwardena *Abstract* In the ‘Second Paralogism” of the *Critique of Pure Reason *Kant critically scrutinizes the claims of rational psychology to be able to demonstrate that the soul, or ‘thinking I,’ is simple. Kant maintains that no such knowledge can be attained by human beings, but he also claims that the attempt to arrive at such knowledge is the result of ‘transcendental illusion’: an abiding and universal intellectual illusion that tempts finite beings to see the Principle of Sufficient Reason as unrestrictedly valid. I discuss how transcendental illusion is supposed to tempt us to commit the fallacy that constitutes the second paralogism, and I endeavour also to explain in what exactly that fallacy consists. -- Kyle Mitchell and Shyane Siriwardena Secretaries of the Moral Sciences Club Faculty of Philosophy University of Cambridge [email protected] http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/seminars-phil/seminars-msc _____________________________________________________ To unsubscribe from the CamPhilEvents mailing list, or change your membership options, please visit the list information page: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEvents List archive: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEventsArchive Please note that CamPhilEvents doesn't accept email attachments. See the list information page for further details and suggested alternatives.
