Inspired by last term's Ultimate Contingency Seminar, we think it might be fun to have a reading group on some issues to do with practical rationality, self-knowledge and self-control. Here's the provisional schedule:
Tuesday May 6th at 11 The first session will be about the epistemology of self-prediction. It is not always easy for you to know what people will do. Are there any special obstacles to your knowing what you yourself will do? Reading: Rummens, Cuypers, "Determinism and the Paradox of Predictability", Erkenn 2010 Tuesday May 13th at 11 The second session will be about decision-dependence. Some theories of practical rationality (causal decision theory is a famous example) say that, sometimes, what you ought to do at a particular time depends on what you believe you will do at that time. Is it a defect in a theory that it says this? Reading: Hare, Hedden, "Self-Reinforcing and Self-Frustrating Decisions" ms. Tuesday May 20th at 11 The third session will be about synchronic and diachronic rationality. Some norms of rationality have to do with how we behave at particular times. Others have to do with how we behave over extended periods of times What is the relation between the two? Reading: Hedden TBA Tuesday June 3rd at 11 The fourth session will be about intentions and diachronic rationality. One way we exert present control over our future behavior is by forming intentions. Once we have formed an intention, in what way are we bound to abide by it? Reading: Holton TBA All very welcome. Richard and Caspar _________________ Richard Holton Faculty of Philosophy University of Cambridge Sidgwick Avenue Cambridge CB3 9DA Tel: +44 (0)1223 760827 http://people.ds.cam.ac.uk/rjh221/index.html
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