> > The 2014 John Locke Lectures in Philosophy: Anger and Forgiveness > > Given by Professor Martha Nussbaum (Ernst Freund Distinguished Service > Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of Chicago) > > Wednesdays, from 7th May-4th June, 5pm to 7pm at Magdalen College (Grove > Auditorium), University of Oxford (map: http://goo.gl/maps/tp6VI; entrance > from Longwall Street) > > > An abstract for the lectures follows below. The manuscript which supports > the lecture series will be made available on the Philosophy Faculty Website > later this week. > > Lecture 1: Furies into Eumenides (7th May) > > Anger is not just ubiquitous, it is also popular – even among philosophers. > Many people think it is impossible to care sufficiently for justice without > anger at injustice. Many also believe that it is impossible for individuals > to vindicate their own self-respect adequately without anger. These lectures > will argue that anger is conceptually confused and normatively pernicious. > It is neither normatively appropriate nor productive in either the personal > or the political life. The first lecture introduces the core ideas, using as > a metaphor the end of Aeschylus’ Oresteia, in which goddesses of retribution > are transformed into guardians of social welfare. It also introduces a > sub-argument concerning forgiveness: rather than being the normatively benign > alternative to anger that many people believe it to be, forgiveness (at least > as standardly defined) all too often proves a covert form of anger, > extracting humiliation as a condition of forgoing angry attitudes. > > Lecture 2: Anger: Down-ranking, Weakness, Payback (14th May) > > This lecture (a very short form of the chapter 2 available on the website) > analyzes the cognitive content of anger, starting from, but not totally > agreeing with, Aristotle’s definition. With the help of an example, I argue > that anger is almost always normatively flawed in one of two ways. Either it > wrongly supposes that punishing the aggressor could make good a past damage – > an idea of cosmic balance with deep roots in the human psyche but nonsensical > – or, in the case where the angry person focuses exclusively on offense to > relative status, it may possibly make sense (a relative lowering of the > offender does effect a relative raising of the victim), but the exclusive > focus on status is normatively problematic. Although anger may still be > useful as a signal, a motivation, and/or a deterrent, its flaws compromise > even this instrumental role. I then discuss a concept that I call the > Transition: a constructive segue from backward-looking anger to constructive > thought about the future. And I identify one species of anger that I do > consider normatively unproblematic, which I call Transition-Anger. I also > discuss the connection between anger and a displaced sense of helplessness, > and examine a possible role for empathy in extricating oneself from the trap > of anger. > > Lecture 3: Anger in the Personal Realm (21st May) > > It is commonly thought that people who have been wronged by intimates ought > to be angry, because they owe it to their self-respect so to react. This > lecture (a very short form of chapter 4 on the website) contests that claim, > discussing anger between intimate partners and anger between adult children > and their parents (but focusing on the latter for reasons of time). I end > with a discussion of self-anger. In all cases I pursue my sub-theme of > forgiveness, arguing that generosity, and not the extraction of apologies, Is > what we need. > > Lecture 4: The Political Realm: Everyday Justice (28th May) > > Many people think that the institutions of the legal system ought to embody > the spirit of (justified) anger, and they defend a picture of criminal > punishment along these lines. In keeping with the forward-looking and > constructive attitude I have defended previously, I criticized criminal law > retributivism and defend a Millean (not exactly Benthamite) form of > welfarism, looking at the implications of these ideas for several specific > aspects of the criminal justice system (victim impact statements, shame-based > penalties, juvenile justice conferencing, mercy at the sentencing phase). I > insist, however, that the ex post focus of the criminal justice system is > actually a narrow part of the task of a good society in dealing with crime. > Forward-looking strategies should focus above all on education, health care, > nutrition, and inclusion in the political process. (This lecture is a short > form of chapter 6 on the website.) > > Lecture 5: The Political Realm: Revolutionary Justice (4th June) > > When there is great injustice, it is very tempting to think that righteous > anger is the best response, and even a necessary response. On the other > hand, it is noteworthy that the three most successful revolutionary freedom > movements in the past century have been conducted in a spirit of non-anger > (distinct from, though sometimes joined to, non-violence): Gandhi’s > independence movement, Martin Luther King, Jr.’s role in the U. S. civil > rights movement, and Nelson Mandela’s freedom movement in South Africa. > Studying the thought and practice of these three leaders, I argue that > non-anger is both normatively and practically superior to anger. (This > lecture is a short form of chapter 7 from the website.) >
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