Dear all, A reminder that tomorrow (Wed) at Serious Metaphysics, Professor Richard Holton (MIT) will be speaking on "Primitive Self-Ascription: Lewis on the De Se", abstract below.
We'll meet at 4:30pm in the Philosophy Faculty Boardroom, and go to the Granta for a quick drink afterwards - all welcome. Best, Emily _______________________________________ >Abstract: > > There are two parts to Lewis's account of the de se. First there is the > idea that the objects of de se thought (and, by extension of de dicto > thought too) are properties, not propositions. This is the idea that is > center-stage in Lewis's discussion. Second there is the idea that the > relation that thinkers bear to these properties is that of > self-ascription. It is crucial to Lewis's account that this is understood > as a fundamental, unanalyzable, notion: self-ascription of a property is > not ascription of a property to the self, on a par with ascription to > someone else. I argue that this dimension of Lewis's account has been > largely overlooked, especially given the current tendency to understand > the account in terms of centred worlds. It is the source of many > problems. First-person plural ascriptions risk becoming baroque; a > plausible generality constraint is lost; and, once the de dicto is > analyzed as Lewis suggests, de dicto ascriptions become objectionably > egocentric. > > > > > _____________________________________________________ Sent by the CamPhilEvents mailing list. To unsubscribe or change your membership options, please visit the list information page: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEvents Posts are archived here: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEventsArchive
