Dear all, This week, Serious Metaphysics will feature our own Yohan Joo presenting "Virtue, Luck and Knowledge" (abstract below). We'll meet at 12pm in the Philosophy Faculty Board Room. I hope to see many of you there.
Best, Emily Virtue, Luck and Knowledge Duncan Pritchard argues in his paper 'Anti-luck Virtue Epistemology'(2011) that his hybrid theory can accomodate our two distinct intuitions on knowledge: the anti-luck intuition and the ability intuition. I argue contrary. I present cases to show that Pritchard's theory is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge. The cases I present together iluminate the nature of epistemic luck, and imply that our knowledge is fundamentally subject to epistemic luck. If we know something, then it is because we are lucky. In addition, I argue that the safety condition as understood by Pritchard is far from well-established. _____________________________________________________ Sent by the CamPhilEvents mailing list. To unsubscribe or change your membership options, please visit the list information page: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEvents Posts are archived here: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEventsArchive
