Dear all, A gentle reminder that Alexander Greenberg will be speaking at SM today on "How to understand a failed plan; or, what Adam Smith tells us about other minds" (abstract below).
As usual, we'll meet at 5:30pm in the Philosophy Faculty Boardroom. Best, Emily _________________ ABSTRACT - "How to understand a failed plan; or, what Adam Smith tells us about other minds" Simulation theory claims that our knowledge of the minds of others comes from imagining ourselves in the positions of others. One philosopher who likewise considered imagining oneself in the position of others to be important was Adam Smith. However, Smith saw this kind of imagination as explanation our *moral* evaluation of others. If Smith is right on this point - which I shall argue he is - then simulation theory must be mistaken; or at least very limited in its scope. For example, if our knowledge that someone is angry comes from imagining ourselves in their place, then we cannot then judge that anger to be unjustified by imagining that we would not feel it if we were in their position. Simulation therefore leaves as a mystery how we may *know* someone has some feelings which we do not and would not share. This problematic feature of simulation theory can be illustrated by a comparison to R.G. Collingwood's theory of historical understanding, an account very similar to simulation theory. Collingwood accepted that a consequence of his theory was that it is *impossible* to understand the reasons behind a failed plan. Simulation theorists, I argue, in the same way make it impossible to explain how we have knowledge of feelings we disapprove of. But whereas Collingwood wholeheartedly accepted this paradoxical consequence of his theory, simulation theorists are less likely to view such a consequence as acceptable. _____________________________________________________ Sent by the CamPhilEvents mailing list. To unsubscribe or change your membership options, please visit the list information page: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEvents
