On Tue, 2004-07-13 at 11:03, Magnus Hagander wrote: > > >> This isn't happening for a number of reasons, the most > > obvious being > > >> that we cannot require initdb to be run interactively. > > (That stern > > >> warning will not impress /dev/null.) > > > > > This is the very reason --pwfile was added. > > > > No, that does not address the objection in the least. That > > simply allows a level of indirection. There still has to be > > user interaction going on somewhere to supply the password. > > Right. I realised that after posting. > > I still think it would be a good move to add a switch you have to > explicitly put in there to make it use "trust" auth by default. This can > spit out some warnings, which will of course be ignored by RPM and such > packagers. But for those installs the package creator made the > decisions, and we will still get most of the > install-from-source-but-don't-know-about-the-switches people. > > It would, of course, be better if the RPMs could do this as well. Don'tk > now how they work, though, but I assume this is the part that has been > discussed before by people who do. > > Or we could initdb with requiring password, and just refuse logins with > blank passwords. That way you get a system that can be installed, but > you cannot actually connect to it until you have set a password. We'd > need to supply a tool that could change the password without connecting > (since you can't connect with no password, catch-22) but that should be > fairly straightforward with a standalone backend, right? > > > > For reference, does anybody know how other databases do it? Like MySQL > or Oracle (which both run on RedHat, which should mean RPMs, right?) I > know MSSQL refuses to install with blank passwords these days (didn't > use to be that way, no, which is why there are still a lot of > installations out there with blank sa passwords). >
I am sure Chris would back me up on saying that the inability to authenticate a database connection is the #1 support problem on the phppgadmin mailing lists.... and you want to make this harder for people?? I think we are obliged to provide security mechanisms that people can use, and to make sure our software is a not a conduit of exploits for the systems we're installed on, but forcing people to deploy the software in a fasion that we deem acceptable for production use goes above and beyond what we should be doing. Robert Treat -- Build A Brighter Lamp :: Linux Apache {middleware} PostgreSQL ---------------------------(end of broadcast)--------------------------- TIP 1: subscribe and unsubscribe commands go to [EMAIL PROTECTED]