On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 10:17:49AM -0500, Tom Lane wrote: > Christoph Berg <m...@debian.org> writes: > > Currently the server insists on ssl_key_file's permissions to be 0600 > > or less, and be owned by the database user. Debian has been patching > > be-secure.c since forever (the git history goes back to 8.2beta1) to > > relax that to 0640 or less, and owned by root or the database user. > > Debian can do that if they like, but it's entirely unacceptable as an > across-the-board patch. Not all systems treat groups as being narrow > domains in which it's okay to assume that group-readable files are > secure enough to be keys. As an example, on OS X user files tend to be > group "staff" or "admin" which'd be close enough to world readable. > > We could allow group-readable if we had some way to know whether to > trust the specific group, but I don't think there's any practical > way to do that. System conventions vary too much.
Should we have a GUC to control the group permissions restriction? I can certainly see value in allowing for group access to the certificate. -- Bruce Momjian <br...@momjian.us> http://momjian.us EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com + As you are, so once was I. As I am, so you will be. + + Roman grave inscription + -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers
