Andrew Dunstan <and...@dunslane.net> writes:
> On 03/12/2014 02:09 PM, Josh Berkus wrote:
>> Well, if you really want my "I want a pony" list:
>>
>> Local superusers (maybe this concept needs another name) would be able
>> to do the following things in a *single* database:
>>
>> 1 change permissions for other users on that database and its objects
>> 2 load extensions from a predefined .so directory / list
>> 3 create/modify untrusted language functions
>> 4 create per-database users and change their settings
>> 5 change database settings (SET stuff)
>> 6 NOT change their own user settings
>> 7 NOT change any global users
>> 8 NOT run SET PERSISTENT or other commands with global effect
> Item 3 gives away the store.
Indeed. If you can do (3), you can break out of any of the other
constraints. I suspect even (1) and/or (5) would be enough to mount
trojan-horse attacks against real superusers who visit your database.
I do not put any stock in the notion of "constrained superuser".
regards, tom lane
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