On Mon, 6 Sep 2021 20:47:37 +0100, Tom Lane <t...@sss.pgh.pa.us> said:
> I'm confused by your description of this patch. AFAIK, OpenSSL verifies
> against the system-wide CA pool by default. Why do we need to do
> anything?
Experimentally, no it doesn't. Or if it does, then it doesn't verify
the CN/altnames of the cert.
sslmode=require allows self-signed and name mismatch.
verify-ca errors out if there is no ~/.postgresql/root.crt. verify-full too.
It seems that currently postgresql verifies the name if and only if
verify-full is used, and then only against ~/.postgresql/root.crt CA file.
But could be that I missed a config option?
--
typedef struct me_s {
char name[] = { "Thomas Habets" };
char email[] = { "tho...@habets.se" };
char kernel[] = { "Linux" };
char *pgpKey[] = { "http://www.habets.pp.se/pubkey.txt"; };
char pgp[] = { "9907 8698 8A24 F52F 1C2E 87F6 39A4 9EEA 460A 0169" };
char coolcmd[] = { "echo '. ./_&. ./_'>_;. ./_" };
} me_t;
