On Mon, 2021-02-01 at 11:49 -0500, Stephen Frost wrote: > * Magnus Hagander (mag...@hagander.net) wrote: > > But yes, I think the enforced cleartext password proxying is at the > > core of the problem. LDAP also encourages the idea of centralized > > password-reuse, which is not exactly a great thing for security. > > Right- passing around a user's password in the clear (or even through an > encrypted tunnel) has been strongly discouraged for a very long time, > for very good reason. LDAP does double-down on that by being a > centralized password, meaning that someone's entire identity (for all > the services that share that LDAP system, at least) are compromised if > any one system in the environment is.
Sure. I don't disagree with anything you've said in that paragraph, but as someone who's implementing solutions for other people who are actually deploying, I don't have a lot of control over whether a customer's IT department wants to use LDAP or not. And I'm not holding my breath for LDAP servers to start implementing federated identity, though that would be nice. > Also, if we do add > it, I would think we'd have it under the same check as the other > sensitive pg_stat_activity fields and not be superuser-only. Just the standard HAS_PGSTAT_PERMISSIONS(), then? To double-check -- since giving this ability to the pg_read_all_stats role would expand its scope -- could that be dangerous for anyone? --Jacob
