On Tue, Nov 03, 2020 at 10:15:48AM +0100, Magnus Hagander wrote: > On Wed, Aug 26, 2020 at 2:19 PM Daniel Gustafsson <dan...@yesql.se> wrote: >> That's certainly true. The intention though is to make the code easier to >> follow (more explicit/discoverable) for anyone trying to implement support >> for > > Is it really a reasonable usecase to use RAND_bytes() outside of both > pg_stroing_random() *and' outside of the openssl-specific files (like > be-secure-openssl.c)? Because it would only be those cases that would > have this case, right?
It does not sound that strange to me to assume if some out-of-core code makes use of that to fetch a random set of bytes. Now I don't know of any code doing that. Who knows. > If anything, perhaps the call to RAND_poll() in fork_process.c should > actually be a call to a strong_random_initialize() or something which > would have an implementation in pg_strong_random.c, thereby isolating > the openssl specific code in there? (And with a void implementation > without openssl) I don't think that we have any need to go to such extent just for this case, as RAND_poll() after forking a process is irrelevant in 1.1.1. We are still many years away from removing its support though. No idea if other SSL implementations would require such a thing. Daniel, what about NSS? -- Michael
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