On Wed, Oct 14, 2020 at 05:18:51PM +0900, Michael Paquier wrote: > Sure, thanks. I wanted to keep things isolated in sha2_openssl.c as > that's something specific to the implementation. Thinking more about > it, your suggestion makes a lot of sense in the long-term by including > MD5 and HMAC in the picture. These also go through EVP in OpenSSL, > and we are kind of incorrect currently to not use the OpenSSL flavor > if available (MD5 is not authorized in FIPS, but we still allow it to > be used with the in-core implementation).
I got my hands on that, and this proves to simplify a lot things. In bonus, attached is a 0003 that cleans up some code in pgcrypto so as it uses the in-core resowner facility to handle EVP contexts. -- Michael
From e9c82de0b57bf6f3670da37bbf4996553e3ab9ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Paquier <mich...@paquier.xyz>
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2020 15:28:20 +0900
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/3] Rework SHA2 APIs
This will make easier a switch to EVP for the OpenSSL SHA2 layer.
(Note for self: this commit has been indented.)
---
src/include/common/checksum_helper.h | 12 +-
src/include/common/scram-common.h | 16 +-
src/include/common/sha2.h | 60 ++----
src/include/replication/backup_manifest.h | 3 +-
src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c | 94 ++++++----
src/backend/replication/backup_manifest.c | 30 ++-
src/backend/replication/basebackup.c | 26 ++-
src/backend/utils/adt/cryptohashes.c | 52 ++++--
src/common/checksum_helper.c | 79 ++++++--
src/common/scram-common.c | 166 ++++++++++++-----
src/common/sha2.c | 204 +++++++++++++++++++--
src/common/sha2_openssl.c | 213 ++++++++++++++++------
src/bin/pg_verifybackup/parse_manifest.c | 15 +-
src/bin/pg_verifybackup/pg_verifybackup.c | 24 ++-
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c | 114 +++++++-----
contrib/pgcrypto/internal-sha2.c | 187 ++++---------------
src/tools/pgindent/typedefs.list | 1 +
17 files changed, 835 insertions(+), 461 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/include/common/checksum_helper.h b/src/include/common/checksum_helper.h
index 48b0745dad..4db7a1cce9 100644
--- a/src/include/common/checksum_helper.h
+++ b/src/include/common/checksum_helper.h
@@ -41,10 +41,10 @@ typedef enum pg_checksum_type
typedef union pg_checksum_raw_context
{
pg_crc32c c_crc32c;
- pg_sha224_ctx c_sha224;
- pg_sha256_ctx c_sha256;
- pg_sha384_ctx c_sha384;
- pg_sha512_ctx c_sha512;
+ pg_sha2_ctx *c_sha224;
+ pg_sha2_ctx *c_sha256;
+ pg_sha2_ctx *c_sha384;
+ pg_sha2_ctx *c_sha512;
} pg_checksum_raw_context;
/*
@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ typedef struct pg_checksum_context
extern bool pg_checksum_parse_type(char *name, pg_checksum_type *);
extern char *pg_checksum_type_name(pg_checksum_type);
-extern void pg_checksum_init(pg_checksum_context *, pg_checksum_type);
-extern void pg_checksum_update(pg_checksum_context *, const uint8 *input,
+extern int pg_checksum_init(pg_checksum_context *, pg_checksum_type);
+extern int pg_checksum_update(pg_checksum_context *, const uint8 *input,
size_t len);
extern int pg_checksum_final(pg_checksum_context *, uint8 *output);
diff --git a/src/include/common/scram-common.h b/src/include/common/scram-common.h
index 2edae2dd3c..53fc085a38 100644
--- a/src/include/common/scram-common.h
+++ b/src/include/common/scram-common.h
@@ -50,19 +50,19 @@
*/
typedef struct
{
- pg_sha256_ctx sha256ctx;
+ pg_sha2_ctx *sha256ctx;
uint8 k_opad[SHA256_HMAC_B];
} scram_HMAC_ctx;
-extern void scram_HMAC_init(scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *key, int keylen);
-extern void scram_HMAC_update(scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx, const char *str, int slen);
-extern void scram_HMAC_final(uint8 *result, scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx);
+extern int scram_HMAC_init(scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *key, int keylen);
+extern int scram_HMAC_update(scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx, const char *str, int slen);
+extern int scram_HMAC_final(uint8 *result, scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx);
-extern void scram_SaltedPassword(const char *password, const char *salt,
+extern int scram_SaltedPassword(const char *password, const char *salt,
int saltlen, int iterations, uint8 *result);
-extern void scram_H(const uint8 *str, int len, uint8 *result);
-extern void scram_ClientKey(const uint8 *salted_password, uint8 *result);
-extern void scram_ServerKey(const uint8 *salted_password, uint8 *result);
+extern int scram_H(const uint8 *str, int len, uint8 *result);
+extern int scram_ClientKey(const uint8 *salted_password, uint8 *result);
+extern int scram_ServerKey(const uint8 *salted_password, uint8 *result);
extern char *scram_build_secret(const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations,
const char *password);
diff --git a/src/include/common/sha2.h b/src/include/common/sha2.h
index 9c4abf777d..76940cba46 100644
--- a/src/include/common/sha2.h
+++ b/src/include/common/sha2.h
@@ -50,10 +50,6 @@
#ifndef _PG_SHA2_H_
#define _PG_SHA2_H_
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-#endif
-
/*** SHA224/256/384/512 Various Length Definitions ***********************/
#define PG_SHA224_BLOCK_LENGTH 64
#define PG_SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH 28
@@ -69,47 +65,25 @@
#define PG_SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (PG_SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
/* Context Structures for SHA224/256/384/512 */
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
-typedef SHA256_CTX pg_sha256_ctx;
-typedef SHA512_CTX pg_sha512_ctx;
-typedef SHA256_CTX pg_sha224_ctx;
-typedef SHA512_CTX pg_sha384_ctx;
-#else
-typedef struct pg_sha256_ctx
+typedef enum
{
- uint32 state[8];
- uint64 bitcount;
- uint8 buffer[PG_SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH];
-} pg_sha256_ctx;
-typedef struct pg_sha512_ctx
+ PG_SHA224 = 0,
+ PG_SHA256,
+ PG_SHA384,
+ PG_SHA512
+} pg_sha2_type;
+
+typedef struct pg_sha2_ctx
{
- uint64 state[8];
- uint64 bitcount[2];
- uint8 buffer[PG_SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH];
-} pg_sha512_ctx;
-typedef struct pg_sha256_ctx pg_sha224_ctx;
-typedef struct pg_sha512_ctx pg_sha384_ctx;
-#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+ pg_sha2_type type;
+ /* private area used by each SHA2 implementation */
+ void *data;
+} pg_sha2_ctx;
-/* Interface routines for SHA224/256/384/512 */
-extern void pg_sha224_init(pg_sha224_ctx *ctx);
-extern void pg_sha224_update(pg_sha224_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *input0,
- size_t len);
-extern void pg_sha224_final(pg_sha224_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest);
-
-extern void pg_sha256_init(pg_sha256_ctx *ctx);
-extern void pg_sha256_update(pg_sha256_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *input0,
- size_t len);
-extern void pg_sha256_final(pg_sha256_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest);
-
-extern void pg_sha384_init(pg_sha384_ctx *ctx);
-extern void pg_sha384_update(pg_sha384_ctx *ctx,
- const uint8 *, size_t len);
-extern void pg_sha384_final(pg_sha384_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest);
-
-extern void pg_sha512_init(pg_sha512_ctx *ctx);
-extern void pg_sha512_update(pg_sha512_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *input0,
- size_t len);
-extern void pg_sha512_final(pg_sha512_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest);
+extern pg_sha2_ctx *pg_sha2_create(pg_sha2_type type);
+extern int pg_sha2_init(pg_sha2_ctx *ctx);
+extern int pg_sha2_update(pg_sha2_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *data, size_t len);
+extern int pg_sha2_final(pg_sha2_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest);
+extern void pg_sha2_free(pg_sha2_ctx *ctx);
#endif /* _PG_SHA2_H_ */
diff --git a/src/include/replication/backup_manifest.h b/src/include/replication/backup_manifest.h
index fb1291cbe4..e427a3e9fa 100644
--- a/src/include/replication/backup_manifest.h
+++ b/src/include/replication/backup_manifest.h
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ typedef struct backup_manifest_info
{
BufFile *buffile;
pg_checksum_type checksum_type;
- pg_sha256_ctx manifest_ctx;
+ pg_sha2_ctx *manifest_ctx;
uint64 manifest_size;
bool force_encode;
bool first_file;
@@ -48,5 +48,6 @@ extern void AddWALInfoToBackupManifest(backup_manifest_info *manifest,
TimeLineID starttli, XLogRecPtr endptr,
TimeLineID endtli);
extern void SendBackupManifest(backup_manifest_info *manifest);
+extern void FreeBackupManifest(backup_manifest_info *manifest);
#endif
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c
index 0f79b28bb5..ed731b1674 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c
@@ -527,8 +527,10 @@ scram_verify_plain_password(const char *username, const char *password,
password = prep_password;
/* Compute Server Key based on the user-supplied plaintext password */
- scram_SaltedPassword(password, salt, saltlen, iterations, salted_password);
- scram_ServerKey(salted_password, computed_key);
+ if (scram_SaltedPassword(password, salt, saltlen, iterations,
+ salted_password) < 0 ||
+ scram_ServerKey(salted_password, computed_key) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not compute server key");
if (prep_password)
pfree(prep_password);
@@ -653,6 +655,8 @@ mock_scram_secret(const char *username, int *iterations, char **salt,
/* Generate deterministic salt */
raw_salt = scram_mock_salt(username);
+ if (raw_salt == NULL)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not encode salt"); /* same error as follows */
encoded_len = pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN);
/* don't forget the zero-terminator */
@@ -1084,7 +1088,8 @@ verify_final_nonce(scram_state *state)
/*
* Verify the client proof contained in the last message received from
- * client in an exchange.
+ * client in an exchange. Returns true if the verification is a success,
+ * or false for a failure.
*/
static bool
verify_client_proof(scram_state *state)
@@ -1095,27 +1100,33 @@ verify_client_proof(scram_state *state)
scram_HMAC_ctx ctx;
int i;
- /* calculate ClientSignature */
- scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, state->StoredKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
- scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
- state->client_first_message_bare,
- strlen(state->client_first_message_bare));
- scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1);
- scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
- state->server_first_message,
- strlen(state->server_first_message));
- scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1);
- scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
- state->client_final_message_without_proof,
- strlen(state->client_final_message_without_proof));
- scram_HMAC_final(ClientSignature, &ctx);
+ /*
+ * Calculate ClientSignature. Note that we don't log directly a failure
+ * here even when processing the calculations as this could involve a mock
+ * authentication.
+ */
+ if (scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, state->StoredKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
+ state->client_first_message_bare,
+ strlen(state->client_first_message_bare)) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
+ state->server_first_message,
+ strlen(state->server_first_message)) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
+ state->client_final_message_without_proof,
+ strlen(state->client_final_message_without_proof)) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_final(ClientSignature, &ctx) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not calculate client signature");
/* Extract the ClientKey that the client calculated from the proof */
for (i = 0; i < SCRAM_KEY_LEN; i++)
ClientKey[i] = state->ClientProof[i] ^ ClientSignature[i];
/* Hash it one more time, and compare with StoredKey */
- scram_H(ClientKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN, client_StoredKey);
+ if (scram_H(ClientKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN, client_StoredKey) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not hash stored key");
if (memcmp(client_StoredKey, state->StoredKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) != 0)
return false;
@@ -1346,19 +1357,22 @@ build_server_final_message(scram_state *state)
scram_HMAC_ctx ctx;
/* calculate ServerSignature */
- scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, state->ServerKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
- scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
- state->client_first_message_bare,
- strlen(state->client_first_message_bare));
- scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1);
- scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
- state->server_first_message,
- strlen(state->server_first_message));
- scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1);
- scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
- state->client_final_message_without_proof,
- strlen(state->client_final_message_without_proof));
- scram_HMAC_final(ServerSignature, &ctx);
+ if (scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, state->ServerKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
+ state->client_first_message_bare,
+ strlen(state->client_first_message_bare)) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
+ state->server_first_message,
+ strlen(state->server_first_message)) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
+ state->client_final_message_without_proof,
+ strlen(state->client_final_message_without_proof)) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_final(ServerSignature, &ctx) < 0)
+ {
+ elog(ERROR, "could not calculate server signature");
+ }
siglen = pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
/* don't forget the zero-terminator */
@@ -1388,12 +1402,12 @@ build_server_final_message(scram_state *state)
/*
* Deterministically generate salt for mock authentication, using a SHA256
* hash based on the username and a cluster-level secret key. Returns a
- * pointer to a static buffer of size SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN.
+ * pointer to a static buffer of size SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN, or NULL.
*/
static char *
scram_mock_salt(const char *username)
{
- pg_sha256_ctx ctx;
+ pg_sha2_ctx *ctx;
static uint8 sha_digest[PG_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
char *mock_auth_nonce = GetMockAuthenticationNonce();
@@ -1406,10 +1420,16 @@ scram_mock_salt(const char *username)
StaticAssertStmt(PG_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH >= SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN,
"salt length greater than SHA256 digest length");
- pg_sha256_init(&ctx);
- pg_sha256_update(&ctx, (uint8 *) username, strlen(username));
- pg_sha256_update(&ctx, (uint8 *) mock_auth_nonce, MOCK_AUTH_NONCE_LEN);
- pg_sha256_final(&ctx, sha_digest);
+ ctx = pg_sha2_create(PG_SHA256);
+ if (pg_sha2_init(ctx) < 0 ||
+ pg_sha2_update(ctx, (uint8 *) username, strlen(username)) < 0 ||
+ pg_sha2_update(ctx, (uint8 *) mock_auth_nonce, MOCK_AUTH_NONCE_LEN) < 0 ||
+ pg_sha2_final(ctx, sha_digest) < 0)
+ {
+ pg_sha2_free(ctx);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ pg_sha2_free(ctx);
return (char *) sha_digest;
}
diff --git a/src/backend/replication/backup_manifest.c b/src/backend/replication/backup_manifest.c
index a43c793e28..ccde3238da 100644
--- a/src/backend/replication/backup_manifest.c
+++ b/src/backend/replication/backup_manifest.c
@@ -62,7 +62,14 @@ InitializeBackupManifest(backup_manifest_info *manifest,
else
manifest->buffile = BufFileCreateTemp(false);
manifest->checksum_type = manifest_checksum_type;
- pg_sha256_init(&manifest->manifest_ctx);
+ if (want_manifest == MANIFEST_OPTION_NO)
+ manifest->manifest_ctx = NULL;
+ else
+ {
+ manifest->manifest_ctx = pg_sha2_create(PG_SHA256);
+ if (pg_sha2_init(manifest->manifest_ctx) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "failed to initialize checksum of backup manifest");
+ }
manifest->manifest_size = UINT64CONST(0);
manifest->force_encode = (want_manifest == MANIFEST_OPTION_FORCE_ENCODE);
manifest->first_file = true;
@@ -74,6 +81,16 @@ InitializeBackupManifest(backup_manifest_info *manifest,
"\"Files\": [");
}
+/*
+ * Free resources assigned to a backup manifest constructed.
+ */
+void
+FreeBackupManifest(backup_manifest_info *manifest)
+{
+ pg_sha2_free(manifest->manifest_ctx);
+ manifest->manifest_ctx = NULL;
+}
+
/*
* Add an entry to the backup manifest for a file.
*/
@@ -161,6 +178,9 @@ AddFileToBackupManifest(backup_manifest_info *manifest, const char *spcoid,
int checksumlen;
checksumlen = pg_checksum_final(checksum_ctx, checksumbuf);
+ if (checksumlen < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not finalize checksum of file \"%s\"",
+ pathname);
appendStringInfo(&buf,
", \"Checksum-Algorithm\": \"%s\", \"Checksum\": \"",
@@ -305,7 +325,8 @@ SendBackupManifest(backup_manifest_info *manifest)
* twice.
*/
manifest->still_checksumming = false;
- pg_sha256_final(&manifest->manifest_ctx, checksumbuf);
+ if (pg_sha2_final(manifest->manifest_ctx, checksumbuf) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "failed to finalize checksum of backup manifest");
AppendStringToManifest(manifest, "\"Manifest-Checksum\": \"");
hex_encode((char *) checksumbuf, sizeof checksumbuf, checksumstringbuf);
checksumstringbuf[PG_SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH - 1] = '\0';
@@ -368,7 +389,10 @@ AppendStringToManifest(backup_manifest_info *manifest, char *s)
Assert(manifest != NULL);
if (manifest->still_checksumming)
- pg_sha256_update(&manifest->manifest_ctx, (uint8 *) s, len);
+ {
+ if (pg_sha2_update(manifest->manifest_ctx, (uint8 *) s, len) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "failed to update checksum of backup manifest");
+ }
BufFileWrite(manifest->buffile, s, len);
manifest->manifest_size += len;
}
diff --git a/src/backend/replication/basebackup.c b/src/backend/replication/basebackup.c
index b89df01fa7..ddd2138347 100644
--- a/src/backend/replication/basebackup.c
+++ b/src/backend/replication/basebackup.c
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ perform_base_backup(basebackup_options *opt)
if (ti->path == NULL)
{
struct stat statbuf;
- bool sendtblspclinks = true;
+ bool sendtblspclinks = true;
/* In the main tar, include the backup_label first... */
sendFileWithContent(BACKUP_LABEL_FILE, labelfile->data,
@@ -730,6 +730,7 @@ perform_base_backup(basebackup_options *opt)
}
/* clean up the resource owner we created */
+ FreeBackupManifest(&manifest);
WalSndResourceCleanup(true);
pgstat_progress_end_command();
@@ -1094,7 +1095,9 @@ sendFileWithContent(const char *filename, const char *content,
len;
pg_checksum_context checksum_ctx;
- pg_checksum_init(&checksum_ctx, manifest->checksum_type);
+ if (pg_checksum_init(&checksum_ctx, manifest->checksum_type) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not initialize checksum of file \"%s\"",
+ filename);
len = strlen(content);
@@ -1130,7 +1133,10 @@ sendFileWithContent(const char *filename, const char *content,
update_basebackup_progress(pad);
}
- pg_checksum_update(&checksum_ctx, (uint8 *) content, len);
+ if (pg_checksum_update(&checksum_ctx, (uint8 *) content, len) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not update checksum of file \"%s\"",
+ filename);
+
AddFileToBackupManifest(manifest, NULL, filename, len,
(pg_time_t) statbuf.st_mtime, &checksum_ctx);
}
@@ -1584,7 +1590,9 @@ sendFile(const char *readfilename, const char *tarfilename,
bool verify_checksum = false;
pg_checksum_context checksum_ctx;
- pg_checksum_init(&checksum_ctx, manifest->checksum_type);
+ if (pg_checksum_init(&checksum_ctx, manifest->checksum_type) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not initialize checksum of file \"%s\"",
+ readfilename);
fd = OpenTransientFile(readfilename, O_RDONLY | PG_BINARY);
if (fd < 0)
@@ -1758,7 +1766,8 @@ sendFile(const char *readfilename, const char *tarfilename,
update_basebackup_progress(cnt);
/* Also feed it to the checksum machinery. */
- pg_checksum_update(&checksum_ctx, (uint8 *) buf, cnt);
+ if (pg_checksum_update(&checksum_ctx, (uint8 *) buf, cnt) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not update checksum of base backup");
len += cnt;
throttle(cnt);
@@ -1772,7 +1781,8 @@ sendFile(const char *readfilename, const char *tarfilename,
{
cnt = Min(sizeof(buf), statbuf->st_size - len);
pq_putmessage('d', buf, cnt);
- pg_checksum_update(&checksum_ctx, (uint8 *) buf, cnt);
+ if (pg_checksum_update(&checksum_ctx, (uint8 *) buf, cnt) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not update checksum of base backup");
update_basebackup_progress(cnt);
len += cnt;
throttle(cnt);
@@ -1780,8 +1790,8 @@ sendFile(const char *readfilename, const char *tarfilename,
}
/*
- * Pad to a block boundary, per tar format requirements. (This small
- * piece of data is probably not worth throttling, and is not checksummed
+ * Pad to a block boundary, per tar format requirements. (This small piece
+ * of data is probably not worth throttling, and is not checksummed
* because it's not actually part of the file.)
*/
pad = tarPaddingBytesRequired(len);
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/adt/cryptohashes.c b/src/backend/utils/adt/cryptohashes.c
index e897660927..16c61b3333 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/adt/cryptohashes.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/adt/cryptohashes.c
@@ -78,16 +78,21 @@ sha224_bytea(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
bytea *in = PG_GETARG_BYTEA_PP(0);
const uint8 *data;
size_t len;
- pg_sha224_ctx ctx;
+ pg_sha2_ctx *ctx;
unsigned char buf[PG_SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH];
bytea *result;
len = VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(in);
data = (unsigned char *) VARDATA_ANY(in);
- pg_sha224_init(&ctx);
- pg_sha224_update(&ctx, data, len);
- pg_sha224_final(&ctx, buf);
+ ctx = pg_sha2_create(PG_SHA224);
+ if (pg_sha2_init(ctx) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not initialize %s context", "SHA224");
+ if (pg_sha2_update(ctx, data, len) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not update %s context", "SHA224");
+ if (pg_sha2_final(ctx, buf) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not finalize %s context", "SHA224");
+ pg_sha2_free(ctx);
result = palloc(sizeof(buf) + VARHDRSZ);
SET_VARSIZE(result, sizeof(buf) + VARHDRSZ);
@@ -102,16 +107,21 @@ sha256_bytea(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
bytea *in = PG_GETARG_BYTEA_PP(0);
const uint8 *data;
size_t len;
- pg_sha256_ctx ctx;
+ pg_sha2_ctx *ctx;
unsigned char buf[PG_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
bytea *result;
len = VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(in);
data = (unsigned char *) VARDATA_ANY(in);
- pg_sha256_init(&ctx);
- pg_sha256_update(&ctx, data, len);
- pg_sha256_final(&ctx, buf);
+ ctx = pg_sha2_create(PG_SHA256);
+ if (pg_sha2_init(ctx) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not initialize %s context", "SHA256");
+ if (pg_sha2_update(ctx, data, len) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not update %s context", "SHA256");
+ if (pg_sha2_final(ctx, buf) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not finalize %s context", "SHA256");
+ pg_sha2_free(ctx);
result = palloc(sizeof(buf) + VARHDRSZ);
SET_VARSIZE(result, sizeof(buf) + VARHDRSZ);
@@ -126,16 +136,21 @@ sha384_bytea(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
bytea *in = PG_GETARG_BYTEA_PP(0);
const uint8 *data;
size_t len;
- pg_sha384_ctx ctx;
+ pg_sha2_ctx *ctx;
unsigned char buf[PG_SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH];
bytea *result;
len = VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(in);
data = (unsigned char *) VARDATA_ANY(in);
- pg_sha384_init(&ctx);
- pg_sha384_update(&ctx, data, len);
- pg_sha384_final(&ctx, buf);
+ ctx = pg_sha2_create(PG_SHA384);
+ if (pg_sha2_init(ctx) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not initialize %s context", "SHA384");
+ if (pg_sha2_update(ctx, data, len) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not update %s context", "SHA384");
+ if (pg_sha2_final(ctx, buf) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not finalize %s context", "SHA384");
+ pg_sha2_free(ctx);
result = palloc(sizeof(buf) + VARHDRSZ);
SET_VARSIZE(result, sizeof(buf) + VARHDRSZ);
@@ -150,16 +165,21 @@ sha512_bytea(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
bytea *in = PG_GETARG_BYTEA_PP(0);
const uint8 *data;
size_t len;
- pg_sha512_ctx ctx;
+ pg_sha2_ctx *ctx;
unsigned char buf[PG_SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
bytea *result;
len = VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(in);
data = (unsigned char *) VARDATA_ANY(in);
- pg_sha512_init(&ctx);
- pg_sha512_update(&ctx, data, len);
- pg_sha512_final(&ctx, buf);
+ ctx = pg_sha2_create(PG_SHA512);
+ if (pg_sha2_init(ctx) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not initialize %s context", "SHA512");
+ if (pg_sha2_update(ctx, data, len) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not update %s context", "SHA512");
+ if (pg_sha2_final(ctx, buf) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not finalize %s context", "SHA512");
+ pg_sha2_free(ctx);
result = palloc(sizeof(buf) + VARHDRSZ);
SET_VARSIZE(result, sizeof(buf) + VARHDRSZ);
diff --git a/src/common/checksum_helper.c b/src/common/checksum_helper.c
index 79a9a7447b..db50065a8a 100644
--- a/src/common/checksum_helper.c
+++ b/src/common/checksum_helper.c
@@ -77,8 +77,9 @@ pg_checksum_type_name(pg_checksum_type type)
/*
* Initialize a checksum context for checksums of the given type.
+ * Returns 0 for a success, -1 for a failure.
*/
-void
+int
pg_checksum_init(pg_checksum_context *context, pg_checksum_type type)
{
context->type = type;
@@ -92,24 +93,55 @@ pg_checksum_init(pg_checksum_context *context, pg_checksum_type type)
INIT_CRC32C(context->raw_context.c_crc32c);
break;
case CHECKSUM_TYPE_SHA224:
- pg_sha224_init(&context->raw_context.c_sha224);
+ context->raw_context.c_sha224 = pg_sha2_create(PG_SHA224);
+ if (context->raw_context.c_sha224 == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ if (pg_sha2_init(context->raw_context.c_sha224) < 0)
+ {
+ pg_sha2_free(context->raw_context.c_sha224);
+ return -1;
+ }
break;
case CHECKSUM_TYPE_SHA256:
- pg_sha256_init(&context->raw_context.c_sha256);
+ context->raw_context.c_sha256 = pg_sha2_create(PG_SHA256);
+ if (context->raw_context.c_sha256 == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ if (pg_sha2_init(context->raw_context.c_sha256) < 0)
+ {
+ pg_sha2_free(context->raw_context.c_sha256);
+ return -1;
+ }
break;
case CHECKSUM_TYPE_SHA384:
- pg_sha384_init(&context->raw_context.c_sha384);
+ context->raw_context.c_sha384 = pg_sha2_create(PG_SHA384);
+ if (context->raw_context.c_sha384 == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ if (pg_sha2_init(context->raw_context.c_sha384) < 0)
+ {
+ pg_sha2_free(context->raw_context.c_sha384);
+ return -1;
+ }
break;
case CHECKSUM_TYPE_SHA512:
- pg_sha512_init(&context->raw_context.c_sha512);
+ context->raw_context.c_sha512 = pg_sha2_create(PG_SHA512);
+ if (context->raw_context.c_sha512 == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ if (pg_sha2_init(context->raw_context.c_sha512) < 0)
+ {
+ pg_sha2_free(context->raw_context.c_sha512);
+ return -1;
+ }
break;
}
+
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Update a checksum context with new data.
+ * Returns 0 for a success, -1 for a failure.
*/
-void
+int
pg_checksum_update(pg_checksum_context *context, const uint8 *input,
size_t len)
{
@@ -122,25 +154,32 @@ pg_checksum_update(pg_checksum_context *context, const uint8 *input,
COMP_CRC32C(context->raw_context.c_crc32c, input, len);
break;
case CHECKSUM_TYPE_SHA224:
- pg_sha224_update(&context->raw_context.c_sha224, input, len);
+ if (pg_sha2_update(context->raw_context.c_sha224, input, len) < 0)
+ return -1;
break;
case CHECKSUM_TYPE_SHA256:
- pg_sha256_update(&context->raw_context.c_sha256, input, len);
+ if (pg_sha2_update(context->raw_context.c_sha256, input, len) < 0)
+ return -1;
break;
case CHECKSUM_TYPE_SHA384:
- pg_sha384_update(&context->raw_context.c_sha384, input, len);
+ if (pg_sha2_update(context->raw_context.c_sha384, input, len) < 0)
+ return -1;
break;
case CHECKSUM_TYPE_SHA512:
- pg_sha512_update(&context->raw_context.c_sha512, input, len);
+ if (pg_sha2_update(context->raw_context.c_sha512, input, len) < 0)
+ return -1;
break;
}
+
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Finalize a checksum computation and write the result to an output buffer.
*
* The caller must ensure that the buffer is at least PG_CHECKSUM_MAX_LENGTH
- * bytes in length. The return value is the number of bytes actually written.
+ * bytes in length. The return value is the number of bytes actually written,
+ * or -1 for a failure.
*/
int
pg_checksum_final(pg_checksum_context *context, uint8 *output)
@@ -168,19 +207,27 @@ pg_checksum_final(pg_checksum_context *context, uint8 *output)
memcpy(output, &context->raw_context.c_crc32c, retval);
break;
case CHECKSUM_TYPE_SHA224:
- pg_sha224_final(&context->raw_context.c_sha224, output);
+ if (pg_sha2_final(context->raw_context.c_sha224, output) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ pg_sha2_free(context->raw_context.c_sha224);
retval = PG_SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH;
break;
case CHECKSUM_TYPE_SHA256:
- pg_sha256_final(&context->raw_context.c_sha256, output);
- retval = PG_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ if (pg_sha2_final(context->raw_context.c_sha256, output) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ pg_sha2_free(context->raw_context.c_sha256);
+ retval = PG_SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH;
break;
case CHECKSUM_TYPE_SHA384:
- pg_sha384_final(&context->raw_context.c_sha384, output);
+ if (pg_sha2_final(context->raw_context.c_sha384, output) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ pg_sha2_free(context->raw_context.c_sha384);
retval = PG_SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH;
break;
case CHECKSUM_TYPE_SHA512:
- pg_sha512_final(&context->raw_context.c_sha512, output);
+ if (pg_sha2_final(context->raw_context.c_sha512, output) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ pg_sha2_free(context->raw_context.c_sha512);
retval = PG_SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
break;
}
diff --git a/src/common/scram-common.c b/src/common/scram-common.c
index 4971134b22..af2940eccf 100644
--- a/src/common/scram-common.c
+++ b/src/common/scram-common.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
+
#ifndef FRONTEND
#include "postgres.h"
#else
@@ -29,9 +30,9 @@
/*
* Calculate HMAC per RFC2104.
*
- * The hash function used is SHA-256.
+ * The hash function used is SHA-256. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
-void
+int
scram_HMAC_init(scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *key, int keylen)
{
uint8 k_ipad[SHA256_HMAC_B];
@@ -44,13 +45,21 @@ scram_HMAC_init(scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *key, int keylen)
*/
if (keylen > SHA256_HMAC_B)
{
- pg_sha256_ctx sha256_ctx;
+ pg_sha2_ctx *sha256_ctx;
- pg_sha256_init(&sha256_ctx);
- pg_sha256_update(&sha256_ctx, key, keylen);
- pg_sha256_final(&sha256_ctx, keybuf);
+ sha256_ctx = pg_sha2_create(PG_SHA256);
+ if (sha256_ctx == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ if (pg_sha2_init(sha256_ctx) < 0 ||
+ pg_sha2_update(sha256_ctx, key, keylen) < 0 ||
+ pg_sha2_final(sha256_ctx, keybuf) < 0)
+ {
+ pg_sha2_free(sha256_ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
key = keybuf;
keylen = SCRAM_KEY_LEN;
+ pg_sha2_free(sha256_ctx);
}
memset(k_ipad, HMAC_IPAD, SHA256_HMAC_B);
@@ -62,45 +71,75 @@ scram_HMAC_init(scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *key, int keylen)
ctx->k_opad[i] ^= key[i];
}
+ ctx->sha256ctx = pg_sha2_create(PG_SHA256);
+ if (ctx->sha256ctx == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
/* tmp = H(K XOR ipad, text) */
- pg_sha256_init(&ctx->sha256ctx);
- pg_sha256_update(&ctx->sha256ctx, k_ipad, SHA256_HMAC_B);
+ if (pg_sha2_init(ctx->sha256ctx) < 0 ||
+ pg_sha2_update(ctx->sha256ctx, k_ipad, SHA256_HMAC_B) < 0)
+ {
+ pg_sha2_free(ctx->sha256ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Update HMAC calculation
- * The hash function used is SHA-256.
+ * The hash function used is SHA-256. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
-void
+int
scram_HMAC_update(scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx, const char *str, int slen)
{
- pg_sha256_update(&ctx->sha256ctx, (const uint8 *) str, slen);
+ Assert(ctx->sha256ctx != NULL);
+ if (pg_sha2_update(ctx->sha256ctx, (const uint8 *) str, slen) < 0)
+ {
+ pg_sha2_free(ctx->sha256ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Finalize HMAC calculation.
- * The hash function used is SHA-256.
+ * The hash function used is SHA-256. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
-void
+int
scram_HMAC_final(uint8 *result, scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx)
{
uint8 h[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
- pg_sha256_final(&ctx->sha256ctx, h);
+ Assert(ctx->sha256ctx != NULL);
+
+ if (pg_sha2_final(ctx->sha256ctx, h) < 0)
+ {
+ pg_sha2_free(ctx->sha256ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
/* H(K XOR opad, tmp) */
- pg_sha256_init(&ctx->sha256ctx);
- pg_sha256_update(&ctx->sha256ctx, ctx->k_opad, SHA256_HMAC_B);
- pg_sha256_update(&ctx->sha256ctx, h, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
- pg_sha256_final(&ctx->sha256ctx, result);
+ if (pg_sha2_init(ctx->sha256ctx) < 0 ||
+ pg_sha2_update(ctx->sha256ctx, ctx->k_opad, SHA256_HMAC_B) < 0 ||
+ pg_sha2_update(ctx->sha256ctx, h, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0 ||
+ pg_sha2_final(ctx->sha256ctx, result) < 0)
+ {
+ pg_sha2_free(ctx->sha256ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pg_sha2_free(ctx->sha256ctx);
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Calculate SaltedPassword.
*
- * The password should already be normalized by SASLprep.
+ * The password should already be normalized by SASLprep. Returns 0 on
+ * success, -1 on failure.
*/
-void
+int
scram_SaltedPassword(const char *password,
const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations,
uint8 *result)
@@ -120,63 +159,86 @@ scram_SaltedPassword(const char *password,
*/
/* First iteration */
- scram_HMAC_init(&hmac_ctx, (uint8 *) password, password_len);
- scram_HMAC_update(&hmac_ctx, salt, saltlen);
- scram_HMAC_update(&hmac_ctx, (char *) &one, sizeof(uint32));
- scram_HMAC_final(Ui_prev, &hmac_ctx);
+ if (scram_HMAC_init(&hmac_ctx, (uint8 *) password, password_len) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&hmac_ctx, salt, saltlen) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&hmac_ctx, (char *) &one, sizeof(uint32)) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_final(Ui_prev, &hmac_ctx) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
memcpy(result, Ui_prev, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
/* Subsequent iterations */
for (i = 2; i <= iterations; i++)
{
- scram_HMAC_init(&hmac_ctx, (uint8 *) password, password_len);
- scram_HMAC_update(&hmac_ctx, (const char *) Ui_prev, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
- scram_HMAC_final(Ui, &hmac_ctx);
+ if (scram_HMAC_init(&hmac_ctx, (uint8 *) password, password_len) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&hmac_ctx, (const char *) Ui_prev, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_final(Ui, &hmac_ctx) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
for (j = 0; j < SCRAM_KEY_LEN; j++)
result[j] ^= Ui[j];
memcpy(Ui_prev, Ui, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
}
+
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Calculate SHA-256 hash for a NULL-terminated string. (The NULL terminator is
- * not included in the hash).
+ * not included in the hash). Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
-void
+int
scram_H(const uint8 *input, int len, uint8 *result)
{
- pg_sha256_ctx ctx;
+ pg_sha2_ctx *ctx;
- pg_sha256_init(&ctx);
- pg_sha256_update(&ctx, input, len);
- pg_sha256_final(&ctx, result);
+ ctx = pg_sha2_create(PG_SHA256);
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (pg_sha2_init(ctx) < 0 ||
+ pg_sha2_update(ctx, input, len) < 0 ||
+ pg_sha2_final(ctx, result) < 0)
+ {
+ pg_sha2_free(ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pg_sha2_free(ctx);
+ return 0;
}
/*
- * Calculate ClientKey.
+ * Calculate ClientKey. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
-void
+int
scram_ClientKey(const uint8 *salted_password, uint8 *result)
{
scram_HMAC_ctx ctx;
- scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, salted_password, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
- scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, "Client Key", strlen("Client Key"));
- scram_HMAC_final(result, &ctx);
+ if (scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, salted_password, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, "Client Key", strlen("Client Key")) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_final(result, &ctx) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
}
/*
- * Calculate ServerKey.
+ * Calculate ServerKey. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
-void
+int
scram_ServerKey(const uint8 *salted_password, uint8 *result)
{
scram_HMAC_ctx ctx;
- scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, salted_password, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
- scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, "Server Key", strlen("Server Key"));
- scram_HMAC_final(result, &ctx);
+ if (scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, salted_password, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, "Server Key", strlen("Server Key")) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_final(result, &ctx) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
}
@@ -207,12 +269,18 @@ scram_build_secret(const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations,
iterations = SCRAM_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS;
/* Calculate StoredKey and ServerKey */
- scram_SaltedPassword(password, salt, saltlen, iterations,
- salted_password);
- scram_ClientKey(salted_password, stored_key);
- scram_H(stored_key, SCRAM_KEY_LEN, stored_key);
-
- scram_ServerKey(salted_password, server_key);
+ if (scram_SaltedPassword(password, salt, saltlen, iterations,
+ salted_password) < 0 ||
+ scram_ClientKey(salted_password, stored_key) < 0 ||
+ scram_H(stored_key, SCRAM_KEY_LEN, stored_key) < 0 ||
+ scram_ServerKey(salted_password, server_key) < 0)
+ {
+#ifdef FRONTEND
+ return NULL;
+#else
+ elog(ERROR, "could not calculate stored key and server key");
+#endif
+ }
/*----------
* The format is:
diff --git a/src/common/sha2.c b/src/common/sha2.c
index 0d329bb238..5a0dfd7f8d 100644
--- a/src/common/sha2.c
+++ b/src/common/sha2.c
@@ -60,6 +60,34 @@
#include "common/sha2.h"
+/* Internal structures used for the private area of pg_sha2_ctx->data */
+typedef struct pg_sha256_ctx
+{
+ uint32 state[8];
+ uint64 bitcount;
+ uint8 buffer[PG_SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+} pg_sha256_ctx;
+typedef struct pg_sha512_ctx
+{
+ uint64 state[8];
+ uint64 bitcount[2];
+ uint8 buffer[PG_SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+} pg_sha512_ctx;
+typedef struct pg_sha256_ctx pg_sha224_ctx;
+typedef struct pg_sha512_ctx pg_sha384_ctx;
+
+/*
+ * In backend, use palloc/pfree to ease the error handling. In frontend,
+ * use malloc to be able to return a failure status back to the caller.
+ */
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#define ALLOC(size) palloc(size)
+#define FREE(ptr) pfree(ptr)
+#else
+#define ALLOC(size) malloc(size)
+#define FREE(ptr) free(ptr)
+#endif
+
/*
* UNROLLED TRANSFORM LOOP NOTE:
* You can define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM to use the unrolled transform
@@ -264,7 +292,7 @@ static const uint64 sha512_initial_hash_value[8] = {
/*** SHA-256: *********************************************************/
-void
+static void
pg_sha256_init(pg_sha256_ctx *context)
{
if (context == NULL)
@@ -461,7 +489,7 @@ SHA256_Transform(pg_sha256_ctx *context, const uint8 *data)
}
#endif /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
-void
+static void
pg_sha256_update(pg_sha256_ctx *context, const uint8 *data, size_t len)
{
size_t freespace,
@@ -562,7 +590,7 @@ SHA256_Last(pg_sha256_ctx *context)
SHA256_Transform(context, context->buffer);
}
-void
+static void
pg_sha256_final(pg_sha256_ctx *context, uint8 *digest)
{
/* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */
@@ -590,7 +618,7 @@ pg_sha256_final(pg_sha256_ctx *context, uint8 *digest)
/*** SHA-512: *********************************************************/
-void
+static void
pg_sha512_init(pg_sha512_ctx *context)
{
if (context == NULL)
@@ -787,7 +815,7 @@ SHA512_Transform(pg_sha512_ctx *context, const uint8 *data)
}
#endif /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
-void
+static void
pg_sha512_update(pg_sha512_ctx *context, const uint8 *data, size_t len)
{
size_t freespace,
@@ -890,7 +918,7 @@ SHA512_Last(pg_sha512_ctx *context)
SHA512_Transform(context, context->buffer);
}
-void
+static void
pg_sha512_final(pg_sha512_ctx *context, uint8 *digest)
{
/* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */
@@ -919,7 +947,7 @@ pg_sha512_final(pg_sha512_ctx *context, uint8 *digest)
/*** SHA-384: *********************************************************/
-void
+static void
pg_sha384_init(pg_sha384_ctx *context)
{
if (context == NULL)
@@ -929,13 +957,13 @@ pg_sha384_init(pg_sha384_ctx *context)
context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] = 0;
}
-void
+static void
pg_sha384_update(pg_sha384_ctx *context, const uint8 *data, size_t len)
{
pg_sha512_update((pg_sha512_ctx *) context, data, len);
}
-void
+static void
pg_sha384_final(pg_sha384_ctx *context, uint8 *digest)
{
/* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */
@@ -963,7 +991,7 @@ pg_sha384_final(pg_sha384_ctx *context, uint8 *digest)
}
/*** SHA-224: *********************************************************/
-void
+static void
pg_sha224_init(pg_sha224_ctx *context)
{
if (context == NULL)
@@ -973,13 +1001,13 @@ pg_sha224_init(pg_sha224_ctx *context)
context->bitcount = 0;
}
-void
+static void
pg_sha224_update(pg_sha224_ctx *context, const uint8 *data, size_t len)
{
pg_sha256_update((pg_sha256_ctx *) context, data, len);
}
-void
+static void
pg_sha224_final(pg_sha224_ctx *context, uint8 *digest)
{
/* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */
@@ -1004,3 +1032,155 @@ pg_sha224_final(pg_sha224_ctx *context, uint8 *digest)
/* Clean up state data: */
memset(context, 0, sizeof(pg_sha224_ctx));
}
+
+/* External routines for this set of SHA2 implementations */
+
+/*
+ * pg_sha2_create
+ *
+ * Allocate a SHA2 context. Returns NULL on failure.
+ */
+pg_sha2_ctx *
+pg_sha2_create(pg_sha2_type type)
+{
+ pg_sha2_ctx *ctx;
+
+ ctx = ALLOC(sizeof(pg_sha2_ctx));
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ctx->type = type;
+
+ switch (type)
+ {
+ case PG_SHA224:
+ ctx->data = ALLOC(sizeof(pg_sha224_ctx));
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA256:
+ ctx->data = ALLOC(sizeof(pg_sha256_ctx));
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA384:
+ ctx->data = ALLOC(sizeof(pg_sha384_ctx));
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA512:
+ ctx->data = ALLOC(sizeof(pg_sha512_ctx));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->data == NULL)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_sha2_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_sha2_init
+ *
+ * Initialize a SHA2 context. Note that this implementation is designed
+ * to never fail, so this always returns 0.
+ */
+int
+pg_sha2_init(pg_sha2_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (ctx->type)
+ {
+ case PG_SHA224:
+ pg_sha224_init((pg_sha224_ctx *) ctx->data);
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA256:
+ pg_sha256_init((pg_sha256_ctx *) ctx->data);
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA384:
+ pg_sha384_init((pg_sha384_ctx *) ctx->data);
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA512:
+ pg_sha512_init((pg_sha512_ctx *) ctx->data);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_sha2_update
+ *
+ * Update a SHA2 context. Note that this implementation is designed
+ * to never fail, so this always returns 0.
+ */
+int
+pg_sha2_update(pg_sha2_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *data, size_t len)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (ctx->type)
+ {
+ case PG_SHA224:
+ pg_sha224_update((pg_sha224_ctx *) ctx->data, data, len);
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA256:
+ pg_sha256_update((pg_sha256_ctx *) ctx->data, data, len);
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA384:
+ pg_sha384_update((pg_sha384_ctx *) ctx->data, data, len);
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA512:
+ pg_sha512_update((pg_sha512_ctx *) ctx->data, data, len);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_sha2_final
+ *
+ * Finalize a SHA2 context. Note that this implementation is designed
+ * to never fail, so this always returns 0.
+ */
+int
+pg_sha2_final(pg_sha2_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (ctx->type)
+ {
+ case PG_SHA224:
+ pg_sha224_final((pg_sha224_ctx *) ctx->data, dest);
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA256:
+ pg_sha256_final((pg_sha256_ctx *) ctx->data, dest);
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA384:
+ pg_sha384_final((pg_sha384_ctx *) ctx->data, dest);
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA512:
+ pg_sha512_final((pg_sha512_ctx *) ctx->data, dest);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_sha2_free
+ *
+ * Free a SHA2 context.
+ */
+void
+pg_sha2_free(pg_sha2_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return;
+ FREE(ctx->data);
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_sha2_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+}
diff --git a/src/common/sha2_openssl.c b/src/common/sha2_openssl.c
index 41673b3a88..57de96df90 100644
--- a/src/common/sha2_openssl.c
+++ b/src/common/sha2_openssl.c
@@ -24,79 +24,172 @@
#include "common/sha2.h"
+/*
+ * In backend, use palloc/pfree to ease the error handling. In frontend,
+ * use malloc to be able to return a failure status back to the caller.
+ */
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#define ALLOC(size) palloc(size)
+#define FREE(ptr) pfree(ptr)
+#else
+#define ALLOC(size) malloc(size)
+#define FREE(ptr) free(ptr)
+#endif
-/* Interface routines for SHA-256 */
-void
-pg_sha256_init(pg_sha256_ctx *ctx)
+/*
+ * pg_sha2_create
+ *
+ * Allocate a SHA2 context. Returns NULL on failure.
+ */
+pg_sha2_ctx *
+pg_sha2_create(pg_sha2_type type)
{
- SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX *) ctx);
+ pg_sha2_ctx *ctx;
+
+ ctx = ALLOC(sizeof(pg_sha2_ctx));
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ctx->type = type;
+
+ switch (type)
+ {
+ case PG_SHA224:
+ case PG_SHA256:
+ ctx->data = ALLOC(sizeof(SHA256_CTX));
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA384:
+ case PG_SHA512:
+ ctx->data = ALLOC(sizeof(SHA512_CTX));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->data == NULL)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_sha2_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ctx;
}
-void
-pg_sha256_update(pg_sha256_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *data, size_t len)
+/*
+ * pg_sha2_init
+ *
+ * Initialize a SHA2 context. Returns 0 on success, and -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_sha2_init(pg_sha2_ctx *ctx)
{
- SHA256_Update((SHA256_CTX *) ctx, data, len);
+ int status = 0;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (ctx->type)
+ {
+ case PG_SHA224:
+ status = SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX *) ctx->data);
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA256:
+ status = SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX *) ctx->data);
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA384:
+ status = SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX *) ctx->data);
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA512:
+ status = SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX *) ctx->data);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* OpenSSL internals return 1 on success, 0 on failure */
+ if (status <= 0)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
}
-void
-pg_sha256_final(pg_sha256_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest)
+/*
+ * pg_sha2_update
+ *
+ * Update a SHA2 context. Returns 0 on success, and -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_sha2_update(pg_sha2_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *data, size_t len)
{
- SHA256_Final(dest, (SHA256_CTX *) ctx);
+ int status;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (ctx->type)
+ {
+ case PG_SHA224:
+ status = SHA224_Update((SHA256_CTX *) ctx->data, data, len);
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA256:
+ status = SHA256_Update((SHA256_CTX *) ctx->data, data, len);
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA384:
+ status = SHA384_Update((SHA512_CTX *) ctx->data, data, len);
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA512:
+ status = SHA512_Update((SHA512_CTX *) ctx->data, data, len);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* OpenSSL internals return 1 on success, 0 on failure */
+ if (status <= 0)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
}
-/* Interface routines for SHA-512 */
-void
-pg_sha512_init(pg_sha512_ctx *ctx)
+/*
+ * pg_sha2_final
+ *
+ * Finalize a SHA2 context. Returns 0 on success, and -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_sha2_final(pg_sha2_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest)
{
- SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX *) ctx);
+ int status;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (ctx->type)
+ {
+ case PG_SHA224:
+ status = SHA224_Final(dest, (SHA256_CTX *) ctx->data);
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA256:
+ status = SHA256_Final(dest, (SHA256_CTX *) ctx->data);
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA384:
+ status = SHA384_Final(dest, (SHA512_CTX *) ctx->data);
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA512:
+ status = SHA512_Final(dest, (SHA512_CTX *) ctx->data);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* OpenSSL internals return 1 on success, 0 on failure */
+ if (status <= 0)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
}
+/*
+ * pg_sha2_free
+ *
+ * Free a SHA2 context.
+ */
void
-pg_sha512_update(pg_sha512_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *data, size_t len)
+pg_sha2_free(pg_sha2_ctx *ctx)
{
- SHA512_Update((SHA512_CTX *) ctx, data, len);
-}
-
-void
-pg_sha512_final(pg_sha512_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest)
-{
- SHA512_Final(dest, (SHA512_CTX *) ctx);
-}
-
-/* Interface routines for SHA-384 */
-void
-pg_sha384_init(pg_sha384_ctx *ctx)
-{
- SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX *) ctx);
-}
-
-void
-pg_sha384_update(pg_sha384_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *data, size_t len)
-{
- SHA384_Update((SHA512_CTX *) ctx, data, len);
-}
-
-void
-pg_sha384_final(pg_sha384_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest)
-{
- SHA384_Final(dest, (SHA512_CTX *) ctx);
-}
-
-/* Interface routines for SHA-224 */
-void
-pg_sha224_init(pg_sha224_ctx *ctx)
-{
- SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX *) ctx);
-}
-
-void
-pg_sha224_update(pg_sha224_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *data, size_t len)
-{
- SHA224_Update((SHA256_CTX *) ctx, data, len);
-}
-
-void
-pg_sha224_final(pg_sha224_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest)
-{
- SHA224_Final(dest, (SHA256_CTX *) ctx);
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return;
+ FREE(ctx->data);
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_sha2_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
}
diff --git a/src/bin/pg_verifybackup/parse_manifest.c b/src/bin/pg_verifybackup/parse_manifest.c
index 608e23538b..e3e4f54ea9 100644
--- a/src/bin/pg_verifybackup/parse_manifest.c
+++ b/src/bin/pg_verifybackup/parse_manifest.c
@@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ verify_manifest_checksum(JsonManifestParseState *parse, char *buffer,
size_t number_of_newlines = 0;
size_t ultimate_newline = 0;
size_t penultimate_newline = 0;
- pg_sha256_ctx manifest_ctx;
+ pg_sha2_ctx *manifest_ctx;
uint8 manifest_checksum_actual[PG_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
uint8 manifest_checksum_expected[PG_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
@@ -652,9 +652,15 @@ verify_manifest_checksum(JsonManifestParseState *parse, char *buffer,
"last line not newline-terminated");
/* Checksum the rest. */
- pg_sha256_init(&manifest_ctx);
- pg_sha256_update(&manifest_ctx, (uint8 *) buffer, penultimate_newline + 1);
- pg_sha256_final(&manifest_ctx, manifest_checksum_actual);
+ manifest_ctx = pg_sha2_create(PG_SHA256);
+ if (manifest_ctx == NULL)
+ context->error_cb(context, "out of memory");
+ if (pg_sha2_init(manifest_ctx) < 0)
+ context->error_cb(context, "could not initialize checksum of manifest");
+ if (pg_sha2_update(manifest_ctx, (uint8 *) buffer, penultimate_newline + 1) < 0)
+ context->error_cb(context, "could not update checksum of manifest");
+ if (pg_sha2_final(manifest_ctx, manifest_checksum_actual) < 0)
+ context->error_cb(context, "could not finalize checksum of manifest");
/* Now verify it. */
if (parse->manifest_checksum == NULL)
@@ -667,6 +673,7 @@ verify_manifest_checksum(JsonManifestParseState *parse, char *buffer,
if (memcmp(manifest_checksum_actual, manifest_checksum_expected,
PG_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0)
context->error_cb(context, "manifest checksum mismatch");
+ pg_sha2_free(manifest_ctx);
}
/*
diff --git a/src/bin/pg_verifybackup/pg_verifybackup.c b/src/bin/pg_verifybackup/pg_verifybackup.c
index bb3733b57e..07320d3699 100644
--- a/src/bin/pg_verifybackup/pg_verifybackup.c
+++ b/src/bin/pg_verifybackup/pg_verifybackup.c
@@ -726,13 +726,26 @@ verify_file_checksum(verifier_context *context, manifest_file *m,
}
/* Initialize checksum context. */
- pg_checksum_init(&checksum_ctx, m->checksum_type);
+ if (pg_checksum_init(&checksum_ctx, m->checksum_type) < 0)
+ {
+ report_backup_error(context, "could not initialize checksum of file \"%s\"",
+ relpath);
+ return;
+ }
/* Read the file chunk by chunk, updating the checksum as we go. */
while ((rc = read(fd, buffer, READ_CHUNK_SIZE)) > 0)
{
bytes_read += rc;
- pg_checksum_update(&checksum_ctx, buffer, rc);
+ if (pg_checksum_update(&checksum_ctx, buffer, rc) < 0)
+ {
+ report_backup_error(context, "could not update checksum of file \"%s\"",
+ relpath);
+ close(fd);
+ return;
+ }
+
+
}
if (rc < 0)
report_backup_error(context, "could not read file \"%s\": %m",
@@ -767,6 +780,13 @@ verify_file_checksum(verifier_context *context, manifest_file *m,
/* Get the final checksum. */
checksumlen = pg_checksum_final(&checksum_ctx, checksumbuf);
+ if (checksumlen < 0)
+ {
+ report_backup_error(context,
+ "could not finalize checksum of file \"%s\"",
+ relpath);
+ return;
+ }
/* And check it against the manifest. */
if (checksumlen != m->checksum_length)
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c
index 6d266e9796..0a216cbe84 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c
@@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ static bool read_server_first_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input);
static bool read_server_final_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input);
static char *build_client_first_message(fe_scram_state *state);
static char *build_client_final_message(fe_scram_state *state);
-static bool verify_server_signature(fe_scram_state *state);
-static void calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state,
+static bool verify_server_signature(fe_scram_state *state, bool *match);
+static bool calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state,
const char *client_final_message_without_proof,
uint8 *result);
@@ -256,11 +256,15 @@ pg_fe_scram_exchange(void *opaq, char *input, int inputlen,
* Verify server signature, to make sure we're talking to the
* genuine server.
*/
- if (verify_server_signature(state))
- *success = true;
- else
+ if (!verify_server_signature(state, success))
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not verify server signature\n"));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (!*success)
{
- *success = false;
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("incorrect server signature\n"));
}
@@ -544,9 +548,15 @@ build_client_final_message(fe_scram_state *state)
goto oom_error;
/* Append proof to it, to form client-final-message. */
- calculate_client_proof(state,
- state->client_final_message_without_proof,
- client_proof);
+ if (!calculate_client_proof(state,
+ state->client_final_message_without_proof,
+ client_proof))
+ {
+ termPQExpBuffer(&buf);
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not calculate client proof\n"));
+ return NULL;
+ }
appendPQExpBufferStr(&buf, ",p=");
encoded_len = pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
@@ -745,9 +755,9 @@ read_server_final_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input)
/*
* Calculate the client proof, part of the final exchange message sent
- * by the client.
+ * by the client. Returns true on success, false on failure.
*/
-static void
+static bool
calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state,
const char *client_final_message_without_proof,
uint8 *result)
@@ -762,61 +772,67 @@ calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state,
* Calculate SaltedPassword, and store it in 'state' so that we can reuse
* it later in verify_server_signature.
*/
- scram_SaltedPassword(state->password, state->salt, state->saltlen,
- state->iterations, state->SaltedPassword);
-
- scram_ClientKey(state->SaltedPassword, ClientKey);
- scram_H(ClientKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN, StoredKey);
-
- scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, StoredKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
- scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
- state->client_first_message_bare,
- strlen(state->client_first_message_bare));
- scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1);
- scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
- state->server_first_message,
- strlen(state->server_first_message));
- scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1);
- scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
- client_final_message_without_proof,
- strlen(client_final_message_without_proof));
- scram_HMAC_final(ClientSignature, &ctx);
+ if (scram_SaltedPassword(state->password, state->salt, state->saltlen,
+ state->iterations, state->SaltedPassword) < 0 ||
+ scram_ClientKey(state->SaltedPassword, ClientKey) < 0 ||
+ scram_H(ClientKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN, StoredKey) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, StoredKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
+ state->client_first_message_bare,
+ strlen(state->client_first_message_bare)) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
+ state->server_first_message,
+ strlen(state->server_first_message)) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
+ client_final_message_without_proof,
+ strlen(client_final_message_without_proof)) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_final(ClientSignature, &ctx) < 0)
+ return false;
for (i = 0; i < SCRAM_KEY_LEN; i++)
result[i] = ClientKey[i] ^ ClientSignature[i];
+
+ return true;
}
/*
* Validate the server signature, received as part of the final exchange
- * message received from the server.
+ * message received from the server. *match tracks if the server signature
+ * matched or not. Returns true if the server signature got verified, and
+ * false for a processing error.
*/
static bool
-verify_server_signature(fe_scram_state *state)
+verify_server_signature(fe_scram_state *state, bool *match)
{
uint8 expected_ServerSignature[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
uint8 ServerKey[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
scram_HMAC_ctx ctx;
- scram_ServerKey(state->SaltedPassword, ServerKey);
-
+ if (scram_ServerKey(state->SaltedPassword, ServerKey) < 0 ||
/* calculate ServerSignature */
- scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, ServerKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
- scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
- state->client_first_message_bare,
- strlen(state->client_first_message_bare));
- scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1);
- scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
- state->server_first_message,
- strlen(state->server_first_message));
- scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1);
- scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
- state->client_final_message_without_proof,
- strlen(state->client_final_message_without_proof));
- scram_HMAC_final(expected_ServerSignature, &ctx);
-
- if (memcmp(expected_ServerSignature, state->ServerSignature, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) != 0)
+ scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, ServerKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
+ state->client_first_message_bare,
+ strlen(state->client_first_message_bare)) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
+ state->server_first_message,
+ strlen(state->server_first_message)) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
+ state->client_final_message_without_proof,
+ strlen(state->client_final_message_without_proof)) < 0 ||
+ scram_HMAC_final(expected_ServerSignature, &ctx) < 0)
return false;
+ /* signature processed, so now check after it */
+ if (memcmp(expected_ServerSignature, state->ServerSignature, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) != 0)
+ *match = false;
+ else
+ *match = true;
+
return true;
}
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/internal-sha2.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/internal-sha2.c
index 9fa940b5bb..9037dfa4a6 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/internal-sha2.c
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/internal-sha2.c
@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ void init_sha384(PX_MD *h);
void init_sha512(PX_MD *h);
/* SHA224 */
-
static unsigned
int_sha224_len(PX_MD *h)
{
@@ -55,42 +54,7 @@ int_sha224_block_len(PX_MD *h)
return PG_SHA224_BLOCK_LENGTH;
}
-static void
-int_sha224_update(PX_MD *h, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen)
-{
- pg_sha224_ctx *ctx = (pg_sha224_ctx *) h->p.ptr;
-
- pg_sha224_update(ctx, data, dlen);
-}
-
-static void
-int_sha224_reset(PX_MD *h)
-{
- pg_sha224_ctx *ctx = (pg_sha224_ctx *) h->p.ptr;
-
- pg_sha224_init(ctx);
-}
-
-static void
-int_sha224_finish(PX_MD *h, uint8 *dst)
-{
- pg_sha224_ctx *ctx = (pg_sha224_ctx *) h->p.ptr;
-
- pg_sha224_final(ctx, dst);
-}
-
-static void
-int_sha224_free(PX_MD *h)
-{
- pg_sha224_ctx *ctx = (pg_sha224_ctx *) h->p.ptr;
-
- px_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
- pfree(ctx);
- pfree(h);
-}
-
/* SHA256 */
-
static unsigned
int_sha256_len(PX_MD *h)
{
@@ -103,42 +67,7 @@ int_sha256_block_len(PX_MD *h)
return PG_SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
}
-static void
-int_sha256_update(PX_MD *h, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen)
-{
- pg_sha256_ctx *ctx = (pg_sha256_ctx *) h->p.ptr;
-
- pg_sha256_update(ctx, data, dlen);
-}
-
-static void
-int_sha256_reset(PX_MD *h)
-{
- pg_sha256_ctx *ctx = (pg_sha256_ctx *) h->p.ptr;
-
- pg_sha256_init(ctx);
-}
-
-static void
-int_sha256_finish(PX_MD *h, uint8 *dst)
-{
- pg_sha256_ctx *ctx = (pg_sha256_ctx *) h->p.ptr;
-
- pg_sha256_final(ctx, dst);
-}
-
-static void
-int_sha256_free(PX_MD *h)
-{
- pg_sha256_ctx *ctx = (pg_sha256_ctx *) h->p.ptr;
-
- px_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
- pfree(ctx);
- pfree(h);
-}
-
/* SHA384 */
-
static unsigned
int_sha384_len(PX_MD *h)
{
@@ -151,42 +80,7 @@ int_sha384_block_len(PX_MD *h)
return PG_SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH;
}
-static void
-int_sha384_update(PX_MD *h, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen)
-{
- pg_sha384_ctx *ctx = (pg_sha384_ctx *) h->p.ptr;
-
- pg_sha384_update(ctx, data, dlen);
-}
-
-static void
-int_sha384_reset(PX_MD *h)
-{
- pg_sha384_ctx *ctx = (pg_sha384_ctx *) h->p.ptr;
-
- pg_sha384_init(ctx);
-}
-
-static void
-int_sha384_finish(PX_MD *h, uint8 *dst)
-{
- pg_sha384_ctx *ctx = (pg_sha384_ctx *) h->p.ptr;
-
- pg_sha384_final(ctx, dst);
-}
-
-static void
-int_sha384_free(PX_MD *h)
-{
- pg_sha384_ctx *ctx = (pg_sha384_ctx *) h->p.ptr;
-
- px_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
- pfree(ctx);
- pfree(h);
-}
-
/* SHA512 */
-
static unsigned
int_sha512_len(PX_MD *h)
{
@@ -199,37 +93,40 @@ int_sha512_block_len(PX_MD *h)
return PG_SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
}
+/* Generic interface for all SHA2 methods */
static void
-int_sha512_update(PX_MD *h, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen)
+int_sha2_update(PX_MD *h, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen)
{
- pg_sha512_ctx *ctx = (pg_sha512_ctx *) h->p.ptr;
+ pg_sha2_ctx *ctx = (pg_sha2_ctx *) h->p.ptr;
- pg_sha512_update(ctx, data, dlen);
+ if (pg_sha2_update(ctx, data, dlen) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not update %s context", "SHA2");
}
static void
-int_sha512_reset(PX_MD *h)
+int_sha2_reset(PX_MD *h)
{
- pg_sha512_ctx *ctx = (pg_sha512_ctx *) h->p.ptr;
+ pg_sha2_ctx *ctx = (pg_sha2_ctx *) h->p.ptr;
- pg_sha512_init(ctx);
+ if (pg_sha2_init(ctx) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not initialize %s context", "SHA2");
}
static void
-int_sha512_finish(PX_MD *h, uint8 *dst)
+int_sha2_finish(PX_MD *h, uint8 *dst)
{
- pg_sha512_ctx *ctx = (pg_sha512_ctx *) h->p.ptr;
+ pg_sha2_ctx *ctx = (pg_sha2_ctx *) h->p.ptr;
- pg_sha512_final(ctx, dst);
+ if (pg_sha2_final(ctx, dst) < 0)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not finalize %s context", "SHA2");
}
static void
-int_sha512_free(PX_MD *h)
+int_sha2_free(PX_MD *h)
{
- pg_sha512_ctx *ctx = (pg_sha512_ctx *) h->p.ptr;
+ pg_sha2_ctx *ctx = (pg_sha2_ctx *) h->p.ptr;
- px_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
- pfree(ctx);
+ pg_sha2_free(ctx);
pfree(h);
}
@@ -238,18 +135,17 @@ int_sha512_free(PX_MD *h)
void
init_sha224(PX_MD *md)
{
- pg_sha224_ctx *ctx;
-
- ctx = palloc0(sizeof(*ctx));
+ pg_sha2_ctx *ctx;
+ ctx = pg_sha2_create(PG_SHA224);
md->p.ptr = ctx;
md->result_size = int_sha224_len;
md->block_size = int_sha224_block_len;
- md->reset = int_sha224_reset;
- md->update = int_sha224_update;
- md->finish = int_sha224_finish;
- md->free = int_sha224_free;
+ md->reset = int_sha2_reset;
+ md->update = int_sha2_update;
+ md->finish = int_sha2_finish;
+ md->free = int_sha2_free;
md->reset(md);
}
@@ -257,18 +153,17 @@ init_sha224(PX_MD *md)
void
init_sha256(PX_MD *md)
{
- pg_sha256_ctx *ctx;
-
- ctx = palloc0(sizeof(*ctx));
+ pg_sha2_ctx *ctx;
+ ctx = pg_sha2_create(PG_SHA256);
md->p.ptr = ctx;
md->result_size = int_sha256_len;
md->block_size = int_sha256_block_len;
- md->reset = int_sha256_reset;
- md->update = int_sha256_update;
- md->finish = int_sha256_finish;
- md->free = int_sha256_free;
+ md->reset = int_sha2_reset;
+ md->update = int_sha2_update;
+ md->finish = int_sha2_finish;
+ md->free = int_sha2_free;
md->reset(md);
}
@@ -276,18 +171,17 @@ init_sha256(PX_MD *md)
void
init_sha384(PX_MD *md)
{
- pg_sha384_ctx *ctx;
-
- ctx = palloc0(sizeof(*ctx));
+ pg_sha2_ctx *ctx;
+ ctx = pg_sha2_create(PG_SHA384);
md->p.ptr = ctx;
md->result_size = int_sha384_len;
md->block_size = int_sha384_block_len;
- md->reset = int_sha384_reset;
- md->update = int_sha384_update;
- md->finish = int_sha384_finish;
- md->free = int_sha384_free;
+ md->reset = int_sha2_reset;
+ md->update = int_sha2_update;
+ md->finish = int_sha2_finish;
+ md->free = int_sha2_free;
md->reset(md);
}
@@ -295,18 +189,17 @@ init_sha384(PX_MD *md)
void
init_sha512(PX_MD *md)
{
- pg_sha512_ctx *ctx;
-
- ctx = palloc0(sizeof(*ctx));
+ pg_sha2_ctx *ctx;
+ ctx = pg_sha2_create(PG_SHA512);
md->p.ptr = ctx;
md->result_size = int_sha512_len;
md->block_size = int_sha512_block_len;
- md->reset = int_sha512_reset;
- md->update = int_sha512_update;
- md->finish = int_sha512_finish;
- md->free = int_sha512_free;
+ md->reset = int_sha2_reset;
+ md->update = int_sha2_update;
+ md->finish = int_sha2_finish;
+ md->free = int_sha2_free;
md->reset(md);
}
diff --git a/src/tools/pgindent/typedefs.list b/src/tools/pgindent/typedefs.list
index c52f20d4ba..149691c26c 100644
--- a/src/tools/pgindent/typedefs.list
+++ b/src/tools/pgindent/typedefs.list
@@ -3180,6 +3180,7 @@ pg_mb_radix_tree
pg_on_exit_callback
pg_re_flags
pg_saslprep_rc
+pg_sha2_ctx
pg_sha224_ctx
pg_sha256_ctx
pg_sha384_ctx
--
2.28.0
From 117f9c2d277d8bb778bd1307d740cd7c6b52b9e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Paquier <mich...@paquier.xyz>
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2020 10:40:06 +0900
Subject: [PATCH v2 2/3] Switch sha2_openssl.c to use EVP
Postgres is two decades late for this switch.
---
src/include/utils/resowner_private.h | 7 +++
src/backend/utils/resowner/resowner.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++
src/common/sha2_openssl.c | 88 +++++++++++++--------------
3 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/include/utils/resowner_private.h b/src/include/utils/resowner_private.h
index a781a7a2aa..5ce6fcf882 100644
--- a/src/include/utils/resowner_private.h
+++ b/src/include/utils/resowner_private.h
@@ -95,4 +95,11 @@ extern void ResourceOwnerRememberJIT(ResourceOwner owner,
extern void ResourceOwnerForgetJIT(ResourceOwner owner,
Datum handle);
+/* support for EVP context management */
+extern void ResourceOwnerEnlargeEVP(ResourceOwner owner);
+extern void ResourceOwnerRememberEVP(ResourceOwner owner,
+ Datum handle);
+extern void ResourceOwnerForgetEVP(ResourceOwner owner,
+ Datum handle);
+
#endif /* RESOWNER_PRIVATE_H */
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/resowner/resowner.c b/src/backend/utils/resowner/resowner.c
index 8bc2c4e9ea..1efb5e98b4 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/resowner/resowner.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/resowner/resowner.c
@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@
*/
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#endif
+
#include "common/hashfn.h"
#include "jit/jit.h"
#include "storage/bufmgr.h"
@@ -128,6 +132,7 @@ typedef struct ResourceOwnerData
ResourceArray filearr; /* open temporary files */
ResourceArray dsmarr; /* dynamic shmem segments */
ResourceArray jitarr; /* JIT contexts */
+ ResourceArray evparr; /* EVP contexts */
/* We can remember up to MAX_RESOWNER_LOCKS references to local locks. */
int nlocks; /* number of owned locks */
@@ -175,6 +180,7 @@ static void PrintTupleDescLeakWarning(TupleDesc tupdesc);
static void PrintSnapshotLeakWarning(Snapshot snapshot);
static void PrintFileLeakWarning(File file);
static void PrintDSMLeakWarning(dsm_segment *seg);
+static void PrintEVPLeakWarning(Datum handle);
/*****************************************************************************
@@ -444,6 +450,7 @@ ResourceOwnerCreate(ResourceOwner parent, const char *name)
ResourceArrayInit(&(owner->filearr), FileGetDatum(-1));
ResourceArrayInit(&(owner->dsmarr), PointerGetDatum(NULL));
ResourceArrayInit(&(owner->jitarr), PointerGetDatum(NULL));
+ ResourceArrayInit(&(owner->evparr), PointerGetDatum(NULL));
return owner;
}
@@ -553,6 +560,17 @@ ResourceOwnerReleaseInternal(ResourceOwner owner,
jit_release_context(context);
}
+
+ /* Ditto for EVP contexts */
+ while (ResourceArrayGetAny(&(owner->evparr), &foundres))
+ {
+ if (isCommit)
+ PrintEVPLeakWarning(foundres);
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy((EVP_MD_CTX *) DatumGetPointer(foundres));
+#endif
+ ResourceOwnerForgetEVP(owner, foundres);
+ }
}
else if (phase == RESOURCE_RELEASE_LOCKS)
{
@@ -725,6 +743,7 @@ ResourceOwnerDelete(ResourceOwner owner)
Assert(owner->filearr.nitems == 0);
Assert(owner->dsmarr.nitems == 0);
Assert(owner->jitarr.nitems == 0);
+ Assert(owner->evparr.nitems == 0);
Assert(owner->nlocks == 0 || owner->nlocks == MAX_RESOWNER_LOCKS + 1);
/*
@@ -752,6 +771,7 @@ ResourceOwnerDelete(ResourceOwner owner)
ResourceArrayFree(&(owner->filearr));
ResourceArrayFree(&(owner->dsmarr));
ResourceArrayFree(&(owner->jitarr));
+ ResourceArrayFree(&(owner->evparr));
pfree(owner);
}
@@ -1370,3 +1390,48 @@ ResourceOwnerForgetJIT(ResourceOwner owner, Datum handle)
elog(ERROR, "JIT context %p is not owned by resource owner %s",
DatumGetPointer(handle), owner->name);
}
+
+/*
+ * Make sure there is room for at least one more entry in a ResourceOwner's
+ * EVP context reference array.
+ *
+ * This is separate from actually inserting an entry because if we run out of
+ * memory, it's critical to do so *before* acquiring the resource.
+ */
+void
+ResourceOwnerEnlargeEVP(ResourceOwner owner)
+{
+ ResourceArrayEnlarge(&(owner->evparr));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remember that an EVP context is owned by a ResourceOwner
+ *
+ * Caller must have previously done ResourceOwnerEnlargeEVP()
+ */
+void
+ResourceOwnerRememberEVP(ResourceOwner owner, Datum handle)
+{
+ ResourceArrayAdd(&(owner->evparr), handle);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Forget that an EVP context is owned by a ResourceOwner
+ */
+void
+ResourceOwnerForgetEVP(ResourceOwner owner, Datum handle)
+{
+ if (!ResourceArrayRemove(&(owner->evparr), handle))
+ elog(ERROR, "EVP context %p is not owned by resource owner %s",
+ DatumGetPointer(handle), owner->name);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Debugging subroutine
+ */
+static void
+PrintEVPLeakWarning(Datum handle)
+{
+ elog(WARNING, "EVP context reference leak: context %p still referenced",
+ DatumGetPointer(handle));
+}
diff --git a/src/common/sha2_openssl.c b/src/common/sha2_openssl.c
index 57de96df90..8cfe69cd69 100644
--- a/src/common/sha2_openssl.c
+++ b/src/common/sha2_openssl.c
@@ -20,9 +20,14 @@
#include "postgres_fe.h"
#endif
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "common/sha2.h"
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+#include "utils/resowner.h"
+#include "utils/resowner_private.h"
+#endif
/*
* In backend, use palloc/pfree to ease the error handling. In frontend,
@@ -52,25 +57,31 @@ pg_sha2_create(pg_sha2_type type)
ctx->type = type;
- switch (type)
- {
- case PG_SHA224:
- case PG_SHA256:
- ctx->data = ALLOC(sizeof(SHA256_CTX));
- break;
- case PG_SHA384:
- case PG_SHA512:
- ctx->data = ALLOC(sizeof(SHA512_CTX));
- break;
- }
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwnerEnlargeEVP(CurrentResourceOwner);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Initialization takes care of assigning the correct type for OpenSSL.
+ */
+ ctx->data = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
if (ctx->data == NULL)
{
explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_sha2_ctx));
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ elog(ERROR, "out of memory");
+#else
FREE(ctx);
return NULL;
+#endif
}
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwnerRememberEVP(CurrentResourceOwner,
+ PointerGetDatum(ctx->data));
+#endif
+
return ctx;
}
@@ -90,16 +101,20 @@ pg_sha2_init(pg_sha2_ctx *ctx)
switch (ctx->type)
{
case PG_SHA224:
- status = SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX *) ctx->data);
+ status = EVP_DigestInit_ex((EVP_MD_CTX *) ctx->data,
+ EVP_sha224(), NULL);
break;
case PG_SHA256:
- status = SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX *) ctx->data);
+ status = EVP_DigestInit_ex((EVP_MD_CTX *) ctx->data,
+ EVP_sha256(), NULL);
break;
case PG_SHA384:
- status = SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX *) ctx->data);
+ status = EVP_DigestInit_ex((EVP_MD_CTX *) ctx->data,
+ EVP_sha384(), NULL);
break;
case PG_SHA512:
- status = SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX *) ctx->data);
+ status = EVP_DigestInit_ex((EVP_MD_CTX *) ctx->data,
+ EVP_sha512(), NULL);
break;
}
@@ -122,21 +137,7 @@ pg_sha2_update(pg_sha2_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *data, size_t len)
if (ctx == NULL)
return 0;
- switch (ctx->type)
- {
- case PG_SHA224:
- status = SHA224_Update((SHA256_CTX *) ctx->data, data, len);
- break;
- case PG_SHA256:
- status = SHA256_Update((SHA256_CTX *) ctx->data, data, len);
- break;
- case PG_SHA384:
- status = SHA384_Update((SHA512_CTX *) ctx->data, data, len);
- break;
- case PG_SHA512:
- status = SHA512_Update((SHA512_CTX *) ctx->data, data, len);
- break;
- }
+ status = EVP_DigestUpdate((EVP_MD_CTX *) ctx->data, data, len);
/* OpenSSL internals return 1 on success, 0 on failure */
if (status <= 0)
@@ -157,21 +158,7 @@ pg_sha2_final(pg_sha2_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest)
if (ctx == NULL)
return 0;
- switch (ctx->type)
- {
- case PG_SHA224:
- status = SHA224_Final(dest, (SHA256_CTX *) ctx->data);
- break;
- case PG_SHA256:
- status = SHA256_Final(dest, (SHA256_CTX *) ctx->data);
- break;
- case PG_SHA384:
- status = SHA384_Final(dest, (SHA512_CTX *) ctx->data);
- break;
- case PG_SHA512:
- status = SHA512_Final(dest, (SHA512_CTX *) ctx->data);
- break;
- }
+ status = EVP_DigestFinal_ex((EVP_MD_CTX *) ctx->data, dest, 0);
/* OpenSSL internals return 1 on success, 0 on failure */
if (status <= 0)
@@ -189,7 +176,14 @@ pg_sha2_free(pg_sha2_ctx *ctx)
{
if (ctx == NULL)
return;
- FREE(ctx->data);
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy((EVP_MD_CTX *) ctx->data);
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwnerForgetEVP(CurrentResourceOwner,
+ PointerGetDatum(ctx->data));
+#endif
+
explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_sha2_ctx));
FREE(ctx);
}
--
2.28.0
From f3ef89d83efd7aeaa9e0186c8cf9c497db5ab4e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Paquier <mich...@paquier.xyz>
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2020 15:49:01 +0900
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] Move pgcrypto to use in-core resowner facility for EVP
This simplifies some code in pgcrypto as it does not need anymore to
rely on its own internal logic for the EVP registration and automatic
cleanup.
---
contrib/pgcrypto/openssl.c | 88 +++++---------------------------------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/openssl.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/openssl.c
index 90951a8ae7..44d612284e 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/openssl.c
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/openssl.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
#include "px.h"
#include "utils/memutils.h"
#include "utils/resowner.h"
+#include "utils/resowner_private.h"
/*
* Max lengths we might want to handle.
@@ -49,67 +50,12 @@
* Hashes
*/
-/*
- * To make sure we don't leak OpenSSL handles on abort, we keep OSSLDigest
- * objects in a linked list, allocated in TopMemoryContext. We use the
- * ResourceOwner mechanism to free them on abort.
- */
typedef struct OSSLDigest
{
const EVP_MD *algo;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
-
- ResourceOwner owner;
- struct OSSLDigest *next;
- struct OSSLDigest *prev;
} OSSLDigest;
-static OSSLDigest *open_digests = NULL;
-static bool digest_resowner_callback_registered = false;
-
-static void
-free_openssl_digest(OSSLDigest *digest)
-{
- EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(digest->ctx);
- if (digest->prev)
- digest->prev->next = digest->next;
- else
- open_digests = digest->next;
- if (digest->next)
- digest->next->prev = digest->prev;
- pfree(digest);
-}
-
-/*
- * Close any open OpenSSL handles on abort.
- */
-static void
-digest_free_callback(ResourceReleasePhase phase,
- bool isCommit,
- bool isTopLevel,
- void *arg)
-{
- OSSLDigest *curr;
- OSSLDigest *next;
-
- if (phase != RESOURCE_RELEASE_AFTER_LOCKS)
- return;
-
- next = open_digests;
- while (next)
- {
- curr = next;
- next = curr->next;
-
- if (curr->owner == CurrentResourceOwner)
- {
- if (isCommit)
- elog(WARNING, "pgcrypto digest reference leak: digest %p still referenced", curr);
- free_openssl_digest(curr);
- }
- }
-}
-
static unsigned
digest_result_size(PX_MD *h)
{
@@ -155,7 +101,10 @@ digest_free(PX_MD *h)
{
OSSLDigest *digest = (OSSLDigest *) h->p.ptr;
- free_openssl_digest(digest);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(digest->ctx);
+ ResourceOwnerForgetEVP(CurrentResourceOwner,
+ PointerGetDatum(digest->ctx));
+ pfree(digest);
pfree(h);
}
@@ -177,41 +126,26 @@ px_find_digest(const char *name, PX_MD **res)
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
}
- if (!digest_resowner_callback_registered)
- {
- RegisterResourceReleaseCallback(digest_free_callback, NULL);
- digest_resowner_callback_registered = true;
- }
-
md = EVP_get_digestbyname(name);
if (md == NULL)
return PXE_NO_HASH;
- /*
- * Create an OSSLDigest object, an OpenSSL MD object, and a PX_MD object.
- * The order is crucial, to make sure we don't leak anything on
- * out-of-memory or other error.
- */
- digest = MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, sizeof(*digest));
-
ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
if (!ctx)
- {
- pfree(digest);
return -1;
- }
+
if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) == 0)
{
- pfree(digest);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
return -1;
}
+ ResourceOwnerEnlargeEVP(CurrentResourceOwner);
+ ResourceOwnerRememberEVP(CurrentResourceOwner, PointerGetDatum(ctx));
+
+ digest = palloc(sizeof(*digest));
digest->algo = md;
digest->ctx = ctx;
- digest->owner = CurrentResourceOwner;
- digest->next = open_digests;
- digest->prev = NULL;
- open_digests = digest;
/* The PX_MD object is allocated in the current memory context. */
h = palloc(sizeof(*h));
--
2.28.0
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
