On Tue, Nov 5, 2019 at 10:02 AM Alvaro Herrera <alvhe...@2ndquadrant.com> wrote: > There's a reason the SQL standard defines SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION but > no RESET SESSION AUTHORIZATION: once you enter a security context, you > cannot escape it. ISTM that essentially we broke feature F321 "User > authorization" by adding RESET into the mix. (I think RESET ROLE breaks > the spirit of feature T331 too.) The SQL:2016 standard describes how > this is supposed to work in Foundation "4.40.1.1 SQL-session > authorization identifiers" (same section is numbered 4.35.1.1 in > SQL:2011), and ISTM we made a huge mess of it. > > I don't see how to fix it, though. If we were to adopt the standard's > mechanism, we'd probably break tons of existing code.
It wouldn't be difficult to introduce a new protocol-level option that prohibits RESET SESSION AUTHORIZATION; and it would also be possible to introduce a new protocol message that has the same effect as RESET SESSION AUTHORIZATION. If you do those two things, then it's possible to create a sandbox which the end client cannot escape but which the pooler can escape easily. -- Robert Haas EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company
