On Fri, Jun 14, 2019 at 02:27:17PM -0400, Joe Conway wrote:
> On 6/13/19 11:07 AM, Bruce Momjian wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 04:26:47PM +0900, Masahiko Sawada wrote:
> >> Yeah, in principle since data key of 2 tier key architecture should
> >> not go outside database I think we should not tell data keys to
> >> utility commands. So the rearranging WAL format seems to be a better
> >> solution but is there any reason why the main data is placed at end of
> >> WAL record? I wonder if we can assemble WAL records as following order
> >> and encrypt only 3 and 4.
> >>
> >> 1. Header data (XLogRecord and other headers)
> >> 2. Main data (xl_heap_insert, xl_heap_update etc + related data)
> >> 3. Block data (Tuple data, FPI)
> >> 4. Sub data (e.g tuple data for logical decoding)
> >
> > Yes, that does sound like a reasonable idea. It is similar to us not
> > encrypting the clog --- there is little value. However, if we only
> > encrypt the cluster, we don't need to expose the relfilenode and we can
> > just encrypt the entire WAL --- I like that simplicity. We might find
> > that the complexity of encrypting only certain tablespaces makes the
> > system slower than just encrypting the entire cluster.
>
>
> There are reasons other than performance to want more granular than
> entire cluster encryption. Limiting the volume of encrypted data with
> any one key for example. And not encrypting #1 & 2 above would help
> avoid known-plaintext attacks I would think.
There are no known non-exhaustive plaintext attacks on AES:
https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/1512/why-is-aes-resistant-to-known-plaintext-attacks
Even if we don't encrypt the first part of the WAL record (1 & 2), the
block data (3) probably has enough format for a plaintext attack.
--
Bruce Momjian <br...@momjian.us> http://momjian.us
EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com
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