On 24/02/2025 14:55, Greg Sabino Mullane wrote:
Guillaume Lelarge <guillaume.lela...@dalibo.com
<mailto:guillaume.lela...@dalibo.com>> wrote:
I'm obviously +1 on this patch since I sent kinda the same patch two
weeks ago
Ha ha, my brain forgot about that one (even though I commented on it!) -
apologies for that.
No need to apologize :)
set password_encryption to 'md5';
create user u4 password 'md5u1';
...
It complains that I'm using a plain text password and a MD5-
encrypted password. Can't be both. (Probably not an issue with this
patch, but rather an issue with the commit that implemented MD5-
password warnings.)
This is correct - it can be both. Not only are we sending a password in
clear text, but we then encrypt it using MD5. Hence, two warnings.
If I use a real md5 password, it only complains about MD5 encrypted
password:
Right. If someone sends us something that looks like an already-
encrypted password, we just store it. See get_password_type() in
backend/libpq/crypt.c. In which case, the actual password that a client
would type in would *not* be what was sent over the wire as part of the
ALTER USER / CREATE USER, so we don't complain.
Sounds good to me.
--
Guillaume Lelarge
Consultant
https://dalibo.com