On 24/02/2025 14:55, Greg Sabino Mullane wrote:
Guillaume Lelarge <guillaume.lela...@dalibo.com <mailto:guillaume.lela...@dalibo.com>> wrote:

    I'm obviously +1 on this patch since I sent kinda the same patch two
    weeks ago


Ha ha, my brain forgot about that one (even though I commented on it!) - apologies for that.


No need to apologize :)

    set password_encryption to 'md5';
    create user u4 password 'md5u1';
    ...

    It complains that I'm using a plain text password and a MD5-
    encrypted password. Can't be both. (Probably not an issue with this
    patch, but rather an issue with the commit that implemented MD5-
    password warnings.)


This is correct - it can be both. Not only are we sending a password in clear text, but we then encrypt it using MD5. Hence, two warnings.

    If I use a real md5 password, it only complains about MD5 encrypted
    password:


Right. If someone sends us something that looks like an already- encrypted password, we just store it. See get_password_type() in backend/libpq/crypt.c. In which case, the actual password that a client would type in would *not* be what was sent over the wire as part of the ALTER USER / CREATE USER, so we don't complain.

Sounds good to me.


--
Guillaume Lelarge
Consultant
https://dalibo.com


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