On Wed, May 16, 2018 at 09:09:22PM -0400, Bruce Momjian wrote: > On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 09:56:49AM +0900, Michael Paquier wrote: >> On Wed, May 16, 2018 at 08:20:49PM -0400, Bruce Momjian wrote: >>> SCRAM-with-binding is the first password method that attempts to avoid >>> man-in-the-middle attacks, and therefore is much less likely to be able >>> to trust what the endpoints supports. I think it is really the >>> channel_binding_mode that we want to control at the client. The lesser >>> modes are much more reasonable to use an automatic best-supported >>> negotiation, which is what we do now. >> >> Noted. Which means that the parameter is ignored when using a non-SSL >> connection, as well as when the server tries to enforce the use of >> anything else than SCRAM. > > Uh, a man-in-the-middle could prevent SSL or ask for a different > password authentication method and then channel binding would not be > used. I think when you say you want channel binding, you have to fail > if you don't get it.
I am not exactly sure what is the result we are looking for here, so I am adding for now an open item which refers to this part of the thread. Please note that I am fine to spend cycles if needed to address any issues and/or concerns. Let's the discussion continue for now. -- Michael
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