On 1/23/23 11:05, Andres Freund wrote: > There's not enough documentation for SYSTEM_USER imo.
If we were to make use of SYSTEM_USER programmatically (and based on what Robert wrote downthread, that's probably not what's desired), I think we'd have to make more guarantees about how it can be parsed and the values that you can expect. Right now it's meant mostly for human consumption. >> You could even go a step further and disable ambient transport >> authentication (sslcertmode=disable gssencmode=disable), which keeps a >> proxied connection from making use of a client cert or a Kerberos cache. But >> for postgres_fdw, at least, that carries a risk of disabling current use >> cases. Stephen and I had a discussion about one such case in the Kerberos >> delegation thread [1]. > > I did not find that very convincing for today's code. The likelihood of > something useful being prevented seems far far lower than preventing privilege > leakage... Fair enough. Preventing those credentials from being pulled in by default would effectively neutralize my concern for the delegation patchset, too. --Jacob
