On Tue, 25 Oct 2022 01:03:23 +0100, Jacob Champion
<jchamp...@timescale.com> said:
> I'd like to try to get this conversation started again. To pique
> interest I've attached a new version of 0001, which implements
> `sslrootcert=system` instead as suggested upthread. In 0002 I went
> further and switched the default sslmode to `verify-full` when using
> the system CA roots, because I feel pretty strongly that anyone
> interested in using public CA systems is also interested in verifying
> hostnames. (Otherwise, why make the switch?)
Yeah I agree that not forcing verify-full when using system CAs is a
giant foot-gun, and many will stop configuring just until it works.
Is there any argument for not checking hostname when using a CA pool
for which literally anyone can create a cert that passes?
It makes sense for self-signed, or "don't care", since that provides
at least protection against passive attacks, but if someone went out
of their way to get a third party signed cert, then it doesn't.
One downside to this approach is that now one option will change the
value of another option. For SSL mode (my rejected patch :-) ) that
makes maybe some more sense.
For users, what is more surprising: A foot-gun that sounds safe, or
one option that overrides another?
--
typedef struct me_s {
char name[] = { "Thomas Habets" };
char email[] = { "tho...@habets.se" };
char kernel[] = { "Linux" };
char *pgpKey[] = { "http://www.habets.pp.se/pubkey.txt"; };
char pgp[] = { "9907 8698 8A24 F52F 1C2E 87F6 39A4 9EEA 460A 0169" };
char coolcmd[] = { "echo '. ./_&. ./_'>_;. ./_" };
} me_t;
