On 4/2/18 11:05, Robert Haas wrote: > Ah. Yeah, that makes sense. Although to use PG as a vector, it seems > like the attacker would need to the ability to snoop network traffic > between the application server and PG. If both of those are > presumably inside the bank's network and yet an attacker can sniff > them, to some degree you've already lost. Now it could be that a > rogue bank employee is trying to gain access from within the bank, or > maybe your bank exposes application-to-database traffic on the public > Internet. But in general that seems like traffic that should be > well-secured anyway for lots of reasons, as opposed to the case where > one part of your browser is trying to hide information from another > part of your browser, which is a lot harder to isolate thoroughly.
I agree the attack is less likely to be applicable in typical database installations. I think we should move forward with considering protocol compression proposals, but any final result should put a warning in the documentation that using compression is potentially insecure. -- Peter Eisentraut http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/ PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services
